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PROTECTING ENERGY PRIVACY ACROSS THE 
PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE 
Matthew B. Kugler & Meredith Hurley* 
Abstract 
Energy-usage monitoring can expose much of what takes place inside 
people’s homes and offices. As the “smart home” revolution continues, 
this data will only become more revealing. Though this information is 
essential for the development of the smart electric grid, it is also useful to 
a variety of others: law enforcement, energy-efficiency experts, and 
marketers. At present, this data enjoys little Fourth Amendment or 
statutory protection. This was not previously a problem because the 
information was historically not overly sensitive. Now that utilities are 
collecting more than two thousand times as much information about 
households as they were before, however, more protection is needed. This 
Article traces the rise of “smart meter” technology, evaluates the Fourth 
Amendment implications of law enforcement access to smart meter 
records, and proposes a statutory framework to govern public and private 
access to such data. It also reflects on the growing challenge of protecting 
digital privacy in an era where once undetectable information is now 
readily and involuntarily shared with third parties and on the Fourth 
Amendment implications of failing to restrict private use of sensitive 
data. 
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At the [Fourth Amendment’s] very core stands the right of a 
man to retreat into his own home and there be free from 
unreasonable governmental intrusion.1 
INTRODUCTION 
As cellular location data show what you do outside the home, energy-
usage data show what you do inside of it. Recent changes in how energy-
usage data is collected and analyzed have drastically altered how much 
can be inferred from this once innocuous information. This change in 
information intrusiveness requires a similar change in information 
protection. This Article sets out a proposal for enhanced energy privacy, 
calling for an expansion of Fourth Amendment protections and new 
federal regulations.  
To understand why this data is important, think about how the energy 
usage of a given house might fluctuate from midnight to midnight. At 1 
AM, energy usage dips as the dishwasher and clothes dryer set to run 
before the occupants went to bed finish their preprogrammed cycles. At 
5:50 AM, a sharp but brief surge signals the activation of a coffeemaker 
bringing water rapidly to boil. At 6:03 AM, there is a slight rise as lights 
begin to turn on. At 6:15 AM, the electric water heater begins a new cycle; 
someone is showering. The data progress onwards to the dip in usage 
when the last occupant leaves the house for the day, to the steady rise as 
person after person returns home after work or school, to again a decline 
in the evening as people move gradually toward bed. The data look 
harmless at first, but the patterns rapidly become clear. This regular 
cycling is the furnace, refrigerator, or air conditioner. That sharp spike is 
a hair dryer or electric kettle. Soon it becomes possible to tell stories—
the house is empty at one time and full at another. A weekday in this 
house follows this rhythm. A weekend follows a different one. This 
weekend? The occupants hosted a party. That weekend? They came home 
late every night. All this data is neatly recorded and stored. 
 
 1. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961). 
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This kind of granular energy-usage data can now be routinely 
collected and shared with local utilities by “smart meters.”2 This 
collection brings with it many benefits, but it comes at a real privacy cost. 
Normally, it would leave no trace you were home alone, watching TV. It 
is the archetypal bad alibi. But energy-usage data provides new 
opportunities. Was the power usage of your house consistent with 
someone being home at 7 PM, or did energy consumption only begin to 
rise hours later? Was there a short spike to indicate that a 1200-watt 
microwave set to work on a bag of Orville Redenbacher popcorn? The 
proposed alibi is now testable. Police have already pursued a homicide 
suspect based in part on smart meter data showing unusual late-night 
water usage, which they believed suggested the cleanup of a crime scene.3 
Some might think this is great: now the government can easily 
determine when you are at home. This will make it easier to investigate 
crimes and serve warrants. But even if that seems unproblematic, how 
readily should this data be shared? Should it be available to university 
researchers looking for potential energy-efficiency improvements? Local 
department stores hoping to sell you a more efficient clothes dryer? Low-
level government employees who may also be your neighbors? Tech 
companies looking to improve the efficiency and “smartness” of your 
home? 
Many products of the “smart home” revolution pose substantial 
privacy risks. People buying an Amazon Alexa or Google Home are 
effectively paying for the privilege of installing microphones and 
recorders in their own houses.4 But smart meters are a unique kind of 
privacy threat. They are involuntarily installed by governmental or quasi-
governmental actors: your local utilities. You often cannot simply choose 
not to have one installed. And they blur the line between public and 
private surveillance, as the relationship between your utility and the 
 
 2. See infra Section I.B. 
 3. Affidavit of Probable Cause to Obtain an Arrest Warrant, Arkansas v. Bates, No. 
CR20160370 (Ark. Cir. Feb. 22, 2016), 2016 WL 7587396. The police affidavit for probable 
cause supporting the arrest warrant noted that the smart water meters in Bentonville take hourly 
measurements of electricity and water. See id. The data from the smart meter revealed that on the 
night of the murder, between 1:00 AM and 3:00 AM, the suspect’s residence used 140 gallons of 
water. Id. The affidavit asserted that the amount of water used during that time period was 
consistent with spraying down the back-patio area to clean off blood. Id. “Upon reviewing all 
water usage information, since October 2013 at James’ residence, this excessive amount of water 
usage between [1:00 AM and 3:00 AM] had never before occurred.” Id. Charges were later 
dropped. E.g., Colin Dwyer, Arkansas Prosecutors Drop Murder Case That Hinged on Evidence 
from Amazon Echo, NPR (Nov. 29, 2017, 5:42 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2017/11/29/567305812/arkansas-prosecutors-drop-murder-case-that-hinged-on-evidence-
from-amazon-echo [https://perma.cc/9EGF-2K7S]. 
 4. See Scott Carey, Does Amazon Alexa or Google Home Listen to My Conversations?, 
TECHWORLD (May 25, 2018), https://www.techworld.com/security/does-amazon-alexa-listen-to-
my-conversations-3661967/ [https://perma.cc/PJL8-FYVQ]. 
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government is fundamentally determined by history and geography rather 
than something that you can choose.5 
Home energy-usage information was historically of limited use. 
Analog meters were only read once a month (and sometimes not that 
often), so they did not reveal much beyond whether the occupant was a 
real energy hog.6 But now digital smart meters can be read every hour, 
every quarter hour, or even every five minutes, and there is no great 
barrier to more frequent measurements.7 This allows for the 
disaggregation of energy signatures—turning coarse electricity-usage 
data into a rich narrative of devices switching on and off. The level of 
granularity described in the first paragraph is still difficult to see—though 
achievable if the meter is collecting minute-by-minute data—but that 
may change over time.8 A smart meter can link to other devices in the 
home.9 Connect a smart meter to a smart home’s management hub—
which in turn is able to sync with all the smart devices in the household—
and the meter will know exactly what some of the big appliances in the 
home are doing. This will explain much of the home’s energy usage, 
leaving the remaining fluctuations easier to process.  
Right now, society is in a transitional period. Smart meters have been 
installed in much of the country and will only be expanding their reach 
in the future. But algorithms and tie-in products for smart meters have not 
yet reached their full potential, so much of their value—both for grid 
management and for privacy invasion—is in the near future rather than 
the present. In this way, this Article provides anticipatory 
recommendations for adequately protecting privacy in the home while 
also allowing for the development of a more efficient smart home.  
Many actors are interested in accessing this energy usage data. 
Researchers and companies want this information to identify customers, 
improve product design, and analyze energy consumption.10 Insurance 
companies want to monitor whether an insured household is actually 
 
 5. See infra notes 118–119 and accompanying text. 
 6. See infra Section I.A. 
 7. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ADVANCED METERING INFRASTRUCTURE AND CUSTOMER 
SYSTEMS: RESULTS FROM THE SMART GRID INVESTMENT GRANT PROGRAM 10 (2016). 
 8. See, e.g., Oliver Parson et al., An Unsupervised Training Method for Non-Intrusive 
Appliance Load Monitoring, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, Dec. 2014, at 1; see also infra notes 95–
100 and accompanying text (explaining how information can be extrapolated from smart meter 
readings). 
 9. See infra Section I.B; see also Stream My Data FAQs, PAC. GAS & ELECTRIC CO., 
https://www.pge.com/en_US/residential/save-energy-money/analyze-your-usage/your-usage/ 
view-and-share-your-data-with-smartmeter/reading-the-smartmeter/stream-your-data-faq.page 
[https://perma.cc/X8TG-GJBB] (explaining smart meter integration with smart home devices).  
 10. Samuel J. Harvey, Note, Smart Meters, Smarter Regulation: Balancing Privacy and 
Innovation in the Electric Grid, 61 UCLA L. REV. 2068, 2079 (2014).  
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occupied.11 Solar providers could use this information to tailor their 
product offerings to match a consumer’s energy-consumption level.12 
Researchers have even proposed examining energy-usage patterns to 
check on the health of elderly people who live alone.13 This data, in many 
ways, are a marketer’s dream.14 Would it not be great to be able to tell 
consumers exactly how much money or energy they would save if they 
switched to a more efficient water heater?  
In both the public and private contexts, then, there is substantial use 
for this data. It provides unique value to those seeking to better manage 
the electric grid and design energy-efficiency programs. It allows law 
enforcement to better understand what is happening inside homes to 
better solve crimes. And it allows for a whole new approach to targeted 
marketing of the home and the creation of smart homes. But, in all these 
cases, consumers are left without a ready means of declining to 
participate. Many utilities have required the installation of smart meters 
and, absent extreme measures, it is difficult to forgo access to the electric 
grid.15  
 
 11. April Weismann, How Does Occupancy and Vacancy Impact Insurance?, HPM INS. 
(Jan. 3, 2018, 11:55 AM), https://www.hpminsurance.com/blog/how-does-occupancy-and-
vacancy-impact-insurance [https://perma.cc/VV8F-RPKR]. 
 12. Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Remaking Energy: The Critical Role of 
Energy Consumption Data, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 1095, 1102 (2016).  
 13. José Alcalá et al., Detecting Anomalies in Activities of Daily Living of Elderly Residents 
via Energy Disaggregation and Cox Processes, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2ND ACM 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON EMBEDDED SYSTEMS FOR ENERGY-EFFICIENT BUILT 
ENVIRONMENTS 225, 225 (2015). Using device disaggregation, researchers believe that they can 
tell enough about the living patterns of these elderly residents to determine when those patterns 
have been unduly disrupted by a health event. Id. at 233. The critical advantage of such monitoring 
is that it requires no additional sensors—the smart meter itself is enough. See BOSCH SOFTWARE 
INNOVATIONS GMBH, WHICH NEW SERVICES CAN ENERGY PROVIDERS OFFER IN THE IOT 
ENVIRONMENT? 14 (2018), https://www.bosch-si.com/connected-energy/insights/downloads/ 
new-businessmodels.html [https://perma.cc/CKQ5-PNBT] (commenting on this possibility, 
among others). 
 14. A major advertising agency even “announced that it was teaming up with a London-
based software company to study ways to collect smart meter data, saying that it would ‘open the 
door of the home.’” Natasha H. Duarte, Recent Development, The Home Out of Context: The 
Post-Riley Fourth Amendment and Law Enforcement Collection of Smart Meter Data, 93 N.C. L. 
REV. 1140, 1156 (2015). Some companies have already started tracking this kind of data, 
including smart-television companies such as VIZIO and insurance companies such as Blue Cross 
Blue Shield, which tracks when consumers utilize sleep-apnea devices. See Marshall Allen, You 
Snooze, You Lose: How Insurers Dodge the Costs of Popular Sleep Apnea Devices, NPR (Nov. 
21, 2008, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2018/11/21/669751038/you-
snooze-you-lose-how-insurers-dodge-the-costs-of-popular-sleep-apnea-devices [https://perma.cc 
/4AT2-KHZD]; Ben Gilbert, There’s a Simple Reason Your New Smart TV Was So Affordable: 
It’s Collecting and Selling Your Data, and Serving You Ads, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 5, 2019, 
9:27 AM), https://amp.businessinsider.com/smart-tv-data-collection-advertising-2019-1 [https:// 
perma.cc/7WAJ-9GLD].  
 15. See infra Section II.C. 
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This lack of consumer choice and the detailed nature of the records 
lead us to believe that people have an expectation of privacy in energy-
usage records and that the government should be required to obtain a 
warrant if it wishes to access those records for law enforcement purposes. 
The analysis required to reach this conclusion works differently for public 
and private utilities. To begin, consider private utilities. Traditionally, the 
Fourth Amendment did not protect this kind of information when it was 
held by a private third party; the United States Supreme Court had held 
that people do not have privacy interests in the information that they 
voluntarily share with institutions such as banks and telephone 
companies.16 Under this logic, energy-usage data in the hands of a private 
utility would be treated as public information for Fourth Amendment 
purposes.17 But the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Carpenter v. 
United States18 has shown a new openness to granting protection in cases, 
like this one, where the introduction of new technology has 
fundamentally shifted the nature of the privacy invasion and people do 
not have a meaningful ability to avoid having their private behavior 
exposed.19 Going forward, courts should recognize that consumers’ 
inability to effectively opt out of smart meter usage means they have not 
voluntarily consented to the sharing of this data.  
The Fourth Amendment analysis takes a different form in the public 
utility context.20 Here, one must first distinguish between law 
enforcement and non-law enforcement uses of the data. When the Fourth 
Amendment is implicated, collection of information for law enforcement 
purposes generally requires a warrant or an exception to the warrant 
requirement, but collection of information for non-law enforcement 
purposes is governed under a more open reasonableness standard.21 Since 
public utilities need granular energy-usage data for the purpose of better 
managing the electric grid, we believe it is reasonable for the government 
to collect that information for that purpose. It is unreasonable, however, 
for the government to then repurpose this same information for use by 
law enforcement absent a warrant given the intrusiveness of the data and 
the way in which they allow the government to peer into the home. This 
complex area of doctrine affects the privacy rights of the nearly 15% of 
Americans who are serviced by a public utility.22 
 
 16. See infra Section II.A. 
 17. See infra Section II.A. 
 18. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
 19. Id. at 2223 (protecting cell phone location records despite several dissents). 
 20. Though Natasha Duarte argued that the third-party doctrine should not apply to smart 
meter data, Duarte, supra note 14, at 1153, this Article is the first to address how the Fourth 
Amendment should regulate information collection by public utilities. 
 21. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221. 
 22. Stats and Facts, AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N, https://www.publicpower.org/public-
power/stats-and-facts [https://perma.cc/5C7F-TX5Y].  
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The same lack of consumer choice that is important in the Fourth 
Amendment context should lead Congress and state legislatures to pass 
new laws protecting energy privacy from both governmental and non-
governmental intrusion. Previous work in this area has addressed the 
challenge of standardizing energy-usage information to allow for greater 
information sharing, pointing to the many potential benefits of granting 
private actors access to this wealth of data.23 We differ from these 
scholars in believing the extreme usefulness of this data poses a 
substantial danger to individual privacy.24 We therefore propose an 
aggressive regime that gives utilities the broad ability to use this data for 
grid management but restricts further uses by third parties such as 
marketers or energy-efficiency companies. Specifically, utilities should 
only be able to share anonymized consumer data or aggregated data from 
a specific town or community. If utilities desire to share specific 
consumer information, they must obtain the consent of the consumer first 
and this consent must be treated as limited in time and scope. These 
principles should be codified by administrative regulations and 
vigorously enforced by agency actions.  
Part I of this Article provides background on the changing landscape 
of energy management in the United States and introduces the 
fundamental privacy trade-off of smart meters, examining the ways in 
which they can expose the activities of the home. Part II analyzes the 
intersection of smart meter data with Fourth Amendment privacy 
protections. It considers both how the third-party doctrine should apply 
to smart meters as well as how to think about the Fourth Amendment 
when the government acts as a utility rather than as an enforcer of 
criminal law. It also considers the interplay between public and private 
privacy standards. In Part III, we move beyond the government context 
and consider the kinds of legal protections necessary to prevent the 
exploitation of energy-usage data by private parties. To this end, we 
recommend a federal statute that regulates the sharing of energy-usage 
data and provides restrictions for which entities can access the data and 
for what purposes. Finally, this Article concludes by recognizing that 
smart meters will be necessary for effective grid management in the 
context of climate change and the increasing need to better manage 
energy resources. But it cautions against the unregulated development of 
smart meters and smart homes due to the need to protect the privacy of 
 
 23. Klass & Wilson, supra note 12, at 1102–03 (noting that the article “focus[ed in part] on 
the difficulty in obtaining such information and its potential uses if gathered on a large scale”). 
 24. Id. at 1157 (“Concerns over reidentification of individual or residential energy 
consumption data are generally less pressing than in other contexts, such as with health care or 
education data.”); id. at 1158 (asserting that “the privacy or confidentiality interests in energy 
consumption data may be overstated”). 
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people within what is perhaps the last sacred place recognized by Fourth 
Amendment law—the home.  
I.  THE CHANGING AMERICAN ELECTRIC GRID 
In this Part we begin by considering how smart meters have changed 
the nature of the American electric grid. The modern electric power 
system, also known as the grid in the United States, is comprised of 
generation units, transmission lines, and distribution wires.25 Electricity 
is produced at generation units such as coal and natural gas power plants, 
carried long distances—sometimes across several states—by 
transmission lines, and then finally delivered to the end users along 
distribution wires.26 The demand for electricity can vary considerably 
hour to hour, day to day, and season to season.27 Since large-scale storage 
of electricity is currently difficult, this necessitates the balancing of 
electricity production and demand.28 If supply is unable to meet demand, 
local blackouts or brownouts can result.29 Though this is unusual in the 
United States, even here, isolated failures in the transmission or 
distribution systems can trigger a cascade of breakdowns when demand 
 
 25. EISEN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 66 (4th ed. 2015).  
 26. See How Electricity Is Delivered to Consumers, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/electricity/delivery-to-consumers.php [https://perma.cc/ 
5DYL-544C] (last updated Oct. 11, 2019). 
 27. Electricity Demand Changes in Predictable Patterns, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. 
(Dec. 6, 2011), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=4190 [https://perma.cc/M6GP-
EGM5] (“Changes in electricity demand levels are generally predictable and have daily, weekly, 
and seasonal patterns.”).  
 28. EISEN ET AL., supra note 25, at 67 (“This means that whenever customers turn the power 
on or off the generating load must be increased or decreased almost instantaneously to avoid 
affecting the voltage significantly.”); NEXIGHT GRP., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ELECTRIC POWER 
INDUSTRY NEEDS FOR GRID-SCALE STORAGE APPLICATIONS 5 (2010), https://www.energy.gov/ 
sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/Utility_12-30-10_FINAL_lowres.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/DV67-DYCQ]; Felix Barber, The Future of Energy Storage: A Lost Opportunity for the 
U.S.?, HARV. U.: SCI. POL’Y (Dec. 6, 2017), http://sitn.hms.harvard.edu/flash/2017/future-energy-
storage-lost-opportunity-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/6JQS-APJK] (“Despite its sparse use at present, 
energy storage, and in particular batteries, could dramatically change the nature of [the grid] 
system. This could happen by both offsetting the maximum power supply required from these 
power plants, and by allowing renewables to provide a larger contribution than is possible with 
conventional electric grids.”); Marshall Brain & Dave Roos, How Power Grids Work, 
HOWSTUFFWORKS (Apr. 1, 2000), https://science.howstuffworks.com/environmental/energy/ 
power.htm [https://perma.cc/7RJH-HNBA]. 
 29. Sara Hoff, U.S. Electric System Is Made Up of Interconnections and Balancing 
Authorities, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 20, 2016), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/ 
detail.php?id=27152 [https://perma.cc/W6E2-YKRV]. 
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for electricity is high, for example on the hottest day in summer.30 This 
can lead to blackouts for millions of people.31  
Demand fluctuates over the course of the day, the season, and the year. 
As demand rises during peak periods—which is commonly in the late 
afternoon or early evenings when everyone arrives home from work or 
school32—more power plants must come online and provide the 
additional electricity required for that short period of time.33 These 
“peaker” electricity generators are idle much of the time and generally 
are the least economical sources; the cheapest and most efficient power 
generators run constantly.34 This careful balancing of supply and demand 
of electricity gives rise to one of the recurring obsessions of modern 
energy management: the shifting of demand from peak periods to off-
peak periods to reduce costs.35   
 
 30. In 2003, the United States suffered its largest blackout, which resulted in “50 million 
people across eight states and two Canadian provinces” losing power in eight minutes. Massoud 
Amin & Phillip F. Schewe, Preventing Blackouts: Building a Smarter Power Grid, SCI. AM. (Aug. 
14, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/preventing-blackouts-power-grid/ [https:// 
perma.cc/K3PU-B2UJ]. 
 31. Marshall Brain & Julia Layton, How Blackouts Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS (Aug. 15, 
2003), https://science.howstuffworks.com/environmental/energy/blackout.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
FD4K-45QB] (“In nearly every major blackout, the situation is the same. One piece of the system 
fails, and then the pieces near it cannot handle the increased load caused by the failure, so they 
fail. The multiple failures make the problem worse and worse, and a large area ends up in the 
dark.”); see Brain & Roos, supra note 28. 
 32. EISEN ET AL., supra note 25, at 74; Beia Spiller, All Electricity Is Not Priced Equally: 
Time-Variant Pricing 101, ENVTL. DEF. FUND: ENERGY EXCHANGE (Jan. 27, 2015), 
http://blogs.edf.org/energyexchange/2015/01/27/all-electricity-is-not-priced-equally-time-
variant-pricing-101/ [https://perma.cc/ZQQ6-3G3W]. 
 33. EISEN ET AL., supra note 25, at 74; Jeff St. John, Dueling Charts of the Day: Peaker 
Plants vs. Green Power, GREENTECH MEDIA (Jan. 17, 2014), https://www.greentechmedia.com/ 
articles/read/dueling-charts-of-the-day-peaker-plants-vs-green-power [https://perma.cc/7AGM-
3H56]; see Bethel Afework et al., Peaking Power, ENERGY EDUC., https://energyeducation.ca 
/encyclopedia/Peaking_power [https://perma.cc/87DB-QYPA] (last updated Sept. 3, 2018) 
(“Natural gas power plants are the most common peaker power plants as they are dispatchable. 
This means they can be turned on or off and their output can change quite quickly.”). 
 34. EISEN ET AL., supra note 25, at 74 (“Generally, the electrical grid is organized so that 
the least expensive available generation is used to meet the next increment of demand. When 
demand is modest, the cheapest generators are able to satisfy it, resulting in modest prices. 
However, during peak periods, all generation resources—even the most expensive—must be 
called upon.”); Mike Orcutt, How a Smarter Grid Can Prevent Blackouts—and Cut Your Energy 
Bills, POPULAR MECHANICS (Aug. 6, 2010), https://www.popularmechanics.com/science/ 
energy/a6013/how-a-smarter-grid-can-prevent-blackouts/ [https://perma.cc/NE4N-5CK5] (“Less 
than half of the generation capacity in the U.S. comes from power plants designed to run all the 
time to meet demand. . . . Reserve plants are much more expensive to operate, resulting in large 
disparities in generation costs throughout the day and year.”).  
 35. Spiller, supra note 32 (explaining the use of time-variant pricing to shift demand). 
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A.  Smart Meters as Energy-Management Tools 
Smart meters are a key tool for monitoring electricity demand 
throughout the day. Use of electricity by consumers is generally tracked 
by a meter that is installed on the consumer’s home or office.36 
Traditionally, these meters were analog.37 A meter reader would come in 
person once per month and, by examining the meter, determine that the 
meter recorded 900 kilowatt-hours of electricity since it was last read.38 
The utility would then bill the consumers for this monthly household 
total.39 Neither the consumer nor the utility knew anything other than the 
monthly total, however.40 There was no way to tell exactly when the 
electricity was consumed at the home.41  
This system for recording energy usage is changing. Smart meters 
have replaced the traditional analog meters over the past decade, and as 
of December 2018 almost 70% of residential units in the United States 
have smart meters installed.42 Smart meters themselves come in various 
types.43 The “dumbest” smart meters merely permit automated meter 
reading (AMR); they broadcast monthly usage information.44 One variant 
of AMR required a van to drive through neighborhoods and send out 
radio signals to query the AMR meters so they would broadcast their 
current usage.45 But more advanced smart meters can be in continuous 
 
 36. See Timothy Thiele, How an Electric Meter Reads Power Usage, SPRUCE, 
https://www.thespruce.com/how-electric-meters-read-power-1152754 [https://perma.cc/ZU9D-
5QER] (last updated June 26, 2019). 
 37. See id. 
 38. See id. 
 39. Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation & Privacy International in 
Support of Plaintiff-Appellant Naperville Smart Meter Awareness & Reversal at 3, 18 n.31, 
Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 900 F.3d 521 (7th Cir. 2018) (No. 16-
3766).  
 40. Karl Bode, Your Smart Electricity Meter Can Easily Spy on You, Court Ruling Warns, 
VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Aug. 24, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/j5n3pb/ 
your-smart-electricity-meter-can-easily-spy-on-you-court-ruling-warns [https://perma.cc/LL5R-
JL2F]. 
 41. Id.   
 42. ADAM COOPER & MIKE SHUSTER, THE EDISON FOUND. INST. FOR ELEC. INNOVATION, 
REPORT: ELECTRIC COMPANY SMART METER DEPLOYMENTS: FOUNDATION FOR A SMART GRID 
(2019 UPDATE) 1 (Dec. 2019), https://www.edisonfoundation.net/iei/publications/Documents/ 
IEI_Smart%20Meter%20Report_2019_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/UUD6-9J5E].  
 43. E.g., Tim J. Smith, Shifting Paradigm: Automated Meter Reading (AMR), WIGLAF J. 
(Sept. 2003), https://www.wiglafjournal.com/industry/energy-utilities/2003/09/shifting-paradigm-
automated-meter-reading-amr/# [https://perma.cc/HY4B-7LXW]. 
 44. Smart vs AMR Meters: What Is the Difference?, YÜ ENERGY (Feb. 6, 2019), 
https://www.yuenergy.co.uk/news/smart-vs-amr-meters-what-is-the-difference [https://perma.cc 
/3B64-34RM]. 
 45. See Dan Benelisha Itron, For Safety’s Sake: AMR Technology Helps Take Meter 
Readers, Customers Out of Harm’s Way, ELECTRIC ENERGY T&D MAG. (May/June 2002), https://
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communication with the local utility.46 These more advanced smart 
meters are part of a larger push for the development of the “smart grid” 
and advanced metering infrastructure (AMI).47 AMI enables two-way 
communication between customers and their utilities.48 An AMI-style 
smart meter can transmit usage information to the utility, receive from 
the utility various pieces of data (such as current power costs), and even 
interface with home energy hubs.49 If traditional analog meters are like 
classic landline telephones, then AMR meters are equivalent to 1990s-
style flip cell phones and 2010s-style AMI smart meters are the iPhone. 
When speaking of smart meters, we have in mind these “smarter” 
smart meters.50 Once installed on a home, these smart meters 
automatically and remotely transmit consumer electricity-usage data to 




 46. See, e.g., Smart vs AMR Meters: What Is The Difference?, supra note 44 (“AMR meters 
only provide kWh information and possible peak kW demand for the month. Smart meters send 
a lot more information, including[:] cumulative kWh usage, daily usage, peak kW demand, 
voltage information, outage information, time of use kWh and peak kW readings.”). 
 47. See ADAM COOPER, THE EDISON FOUND. INST. FOR ELEC. INNOVATION, REPORT: 
ELECTRIC COMPANY SMART METER DEPLOYMENTS: FOUNDATION FOR A SMART GRID 3 (2017); 
Raymar Rashed Mohassel et al., A Survey on Advanced Metering Infrastructure, 63 ELECTRICAL 
POWER & ENERGY SYSTEMS 473, 474 (2014)  
AMI is not a single technology; rather, it is a configured infrastructure that 
integrates a number of technologies to achieve its goals. The infrastructure 
includes smart meters, communication networks in different levels of the 
infrastructure hierarchy, Meter Data Management Systems (MDMS), and means 
to integrate the collected data into software application platforms and interfaces. 
The Smart Home, SMARTGRID.GOV, https://www.smartgrid.gov/the_smart_grid/smart_home 
.html [https://perma.cc /LWN4-VGP3] (“Smart meters provide the Smart Grid interface between 
you and your energy provider.”). 
 48. See Mohassel et al., supra note 47, at 475. 
 49. See id.; see also U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 7, at 10. 
Control technologies include devices such as programmable communicating 
thermostats (PCTs) and direct load control (DLC) devices that utilities and 
customers use to automatically control customers’ heating and cooling systems 
or other energy-intensive devices. In addition, home-area networks (HAN) and 
energy management systems can be installed to automatically control appliances 
in response to price signals, load conditions, or pre-set preferences. (emphasis 
omitted). 
 50. In addition to raising greater privacy challenges, AMI systems are also now more 
common in the United States. See Harvey, supra note 10, at 2072; Marc Harnish, Electricity 
Monthly Update, Highlights: February 2015, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Apr. 27, 2015), 
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/update/archive/april2015/ [https://perma.cc/3FG7-VZB7]; 
COOPER & SHUSTER, supra note 42. 
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hour.51 This greatly increases the amount of information available to 
utilities, allowing for a variety of new efficiencies but coming at the 
expense of consumer privacy.  
Smart meters are produced by a variety of manufacturers and have 
different levels of functionality. Many use Zigbee, a data transmission 
protocol specifically intended for the conveyance of information by low-
power, low-bandwidth radios, including smart meter data.52 But 
variations exist, and not all smart meters have the same capacity to 
interface with consumer products such as smart thermostats, smart 
appliances, and energy dashboards.53 And not all utilities have been 
equally active in incorporating consumers into the power-management 
process. For example, a utility in Ohio offers an “easy-to-use app” that 
allows the user to see energy usage over time, determine how much 
energy is drawn by heating and ventilation systems, and, with the aid of 
a free “energy bridge,” directly control smart devices straight from the 
app.54 In contrast, a utility in New York is currently advertising no 
 
 51. Christine Horne et al., Privacy, Technology, and Norms: The Case of Smart Meters, 51 
SOC. SCI. RES. 64, 65 (2015).  
 52. Joe Ballif, How Smart Energy by the Zigbee Alliance Enables Service Providers and 
Consumers to Improve Consumption Habits and Save Money, ZIGBEE ALLIANCE (June 26, 2018), 
https://zigbee.org/zigbee-alliance-smart-energy-saving-mony-1/ [https://perma.cc/B38X-Q8LR]; 
Benjamin Garcia, ZigBee Smart Energy, TELDAT (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.teldat.com/blog/ 
en/zigbee-smart-energy-smart-metering-home-automation/ [https://perma.cc/6NZ4-RQLX]. 
 53. Not even all devices that use Zigbee are able to communicate with each other due to 
different, and sometimes proprietary, profiles or protocols. See, e.g., J.D. Roberts, FAQ: Zigbee 
Application Profiles, or Why Not All Zigbee Devices Work with SmartThings, SMARTTHINGS 
COMMUNITY (June 25, 2019, 8:28 AM), https://community.smartthings.com/t/faq-zigbee-
application-profiles-or-why-not-all-zigbee-devices-work-with-smartthings/76219 
[https://perma.cc/T498-QRVP]. This concern seems to have been mitigated with the release of 
Zigbee 3.0. See, e.g., Mike Bleakmore, Understanding the Zigbee 3.0 Protocol, DIGI (Apr. 19, 
2018), https://www.digi.com/blog/understanding-the-zigbee-3-0-protocol/ [https://perma.cc/ 
HYY8-PHT2]. Products are therefore sometimes advertised as being compatible with specific 
utility providers. See, e.g., Supported California Utilities, RAINFOREST AUTOMATION, 
https://rainforestautomation.com/state-california-residents/ [https://perma.cc/PPF4-KP4W]. For 
example, at least some utilities in six states (California, Texas, Illinois, Vermont, Hawaii, and 
Pennsylvania) support the Rainforest Eagle 200 Energy Monitoring Gateway. Supported Utilities, 
RAINFOREST AUTOMATION, https://rainforestautomation.com/utilities/ [https://perma.cc/XTP2-
GCR7]. This device uses Zigbee to communicate directly with a compatible smart meter and 
display real-time energy-consumption information. See EAGLE-200™ Intelligent Control 
Gateway, RAINFOREST AUTOMATION (2017), https://rainforestautomation.com/wp-content/ 
uploads/2017/10/eagle-200-datasheet_1.3.pdf [https://perma.cc/NYT5-9YH8].  
 54. Smart Meter Technologies, AEP OHIO, https://www.aepohio.com/info/smart 
meters/technologies.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZY49-WX2T]; Enhance your App Experience, AEP 
OHIO, https://itsyourpowerohio.com/energy-bridge/ [https://perma.cc/9JM8-QS8L]. The utility 
DTE Energy, based in Detroit, uses a similar program that connects an app with an Energy Bridge 
to enable customs to connect their smart home devices and therefore better control their energy 
usage. DTE Insight FAQs, DTE ENERGY, https://newlook.dteenergy.com/wps/wcm/connect/dte-
web/insight/dte-insight-faq [https://perma.cc/8YHG-NPTL].  
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consumer-facing analytics and no compatibility with third-party 
products.55 Perhaps due to differences across utilities,56 some home 
energy-monitoring products opt for more direct approaches to 
measurement. One product uses the infrared port found on most smart 
meters to avoid any radio-connectivity issues.57 Another requires an 
electrician to install clamps on the power mains, bypassing the meter 
entirely.58 
Despite some variability in consumer friendliness, smart meters are 
extremely helpful for utilities. Take the basic issue of service outages. 
Prior to the installation of smart meters, utilities only knew where an 
outage occurred in their service territory when a customer called to report 
it59—remember that the meters themselves had no means of reporting 
back to the utility. But the smart grid allows utilities to directly detect 
when and where outages are occurring, which also gives them a head start 
 
 55. See Mark Harrington, Amid a Sea of Smart Meters, New Time-of-Use Rates Also Are 
Coming, NEWSDAY, https://www.newsday.com/long-island/pseg-smart-meters-rates-1.30602551 
[https://perma.cc/B55V-S7WV] (last updated May 5, 2019, 11:08 PM) (describing the 
introduction of time-of-use rates by PSEG Long Island); Dispelling the Myths and Misconceptions 
of Smart Meters, PSEG LONG ISLAND, https://www.psegliny.com/myaccount/serviceand 
rates/smartmeter/faq [https://perma.cc/2625-PBN8] (promising that the utility will not even view 
individual-level data). A recent report by ACEEE indicates that most utilities with smart meters 
installed provide AMI data to customers via a website and mobile device app. AM. COUNCIL FOR 
AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., LEVERAGING ADVANCED METERING INFRASTRUCTURE TO SAVE 
ENERGY 12 (Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.aceee.org/sites/default/files/publications/research 
reports/u2001.pdf [https://perma.cc/93DQ-M6VX]. 
 56. Apparently, utilities have often created unintentional technological barriers to 
information sharing. See, e.g., Jeff St. John, Texas Takes a Big Step in Improving Access to Smart 
Meter Data, GREENTECH MEDIA (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/ 
read/texas-smart-meter-data-access#gs.atx1d3 [https://perma.cc/ADD8-GJ8D]. 
 57. This product is Energy Cloud by Blue Line Innovations. See Easy Do-It-Yourself 
Installation, BLUE LINE INNOVATIONS, https://www.bluelineinnovations.com/diy-details 
[https://perma.cc/F5RW-L8MS] (stating that the meter sensor slides over the meter and uses the 
customer’s home network to transmit data). It claims to be compatible with the vast majority of 
smart meter types, but no statistics are available. See Compatible Meters, BLUE LINE 
INNOVATIONS, https://www.bluelineinnovations.com/compatibility-window [https://perma.cc/ 
FB78-GFNT]. 
 58. How It Works., SENSE, https://sense.com/product-page [https://perma.cc/2HEF-
SAZW]. Efficiency Vermont has partnered with the company, Sense, to help homeowners save 
energy by identifying individual device energy usage within the home. Efficiency Vermont and 
Sense Conduct Pilot Study of Advanced Home Energy Monitoring, EFFICIENCY VERMONT (July 
24, 2018), https://www.efficiencyvermont.com/news-blog/news/efficiency-vermont-and-sense-
conduct-pilot-study-of-advanced-home-energy-monitoring [https://perma.cc/AWG9-XTK7]. 
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in diagnosing why the outage is occurring.60 AMIs provide “situational 
awareness” to utilities in this way, enabling them to send crews to the 
highest priority areas during outages and understand what percentage of 
their service territory is without power.61 Smart meters also provide 
utilities with the ability to remotely switch the power supply on or off, 
which is critical during storms and other natural disasters.62  
The detailed data provided by smart meters gives utilities almost real-
time information on electricity demand, which can enable the utility to 
better generate the appropriate amount of electricity to meet consumer 
demand for a specific time of day.63 This allows for better calibration of 
production and minimizes surplus electricity.64 Smart meters can also 
provide residential and business users real-time information about 
electricity cost to, hopefully, encourage them to change their 
 
 60. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF INCREASING ELECTRIC 
GRID RESILIENCE TO WEATHER OUTAGES 10–11 (2013) (describing how the smart grid reduced 
power-outage duration in the wake of Superstorm Sandy and Hurricane Irene); How The Smart 
Grid Keeps Your Power On, SMART ENERGY CONSUMER COLLABORATIVE, http://www.whatis 
smartgrid.org/smart-grid-101/fact-sheets/how-the-smart-grid-keeps-your-power-on [https:// 
perma.cc/UGL7-REXE]; Smart Meters Can Reduce Power Outages and Restoration Time, supra 
note 59. 
 61. Jouni Peppanen et al., Leveraging AMI Data for Distribution System Model Calibration 
and Situational Awareness, 6 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SMART GRID 2050, 2056 (2015). 
Situational awareness can provide tangible and monetary improvements through 
increased reliability. Advanced systems provide immediate alerts and early-
warning detection of issues. Locations of outages along with potential feeder 
reconfigurations can be directly known so that crews can be dispatched as 
efficiently as possible. Situational awareness also provides visualization and 
detection of problem areas, such as overloaded lines or inefficient buildings. 
See also COOPER, supra 47, at 3 (describing how smart meter technology allows providers to 
restore power quickly and efficiently).  
 62. EISEN ET AL., supra note 25, at 900; Kim Zetter, Security Pros Question Deployment of 
Smart Meters, WIRED (Mar. 4, 2010, 6:07 PM), https://www.wired.com/2010/03/smart-grids-
done-smartly/ [https://perma.cc/E375-MNR8] (“Digital smart meters have an electronic 
disconnect switch that allows the utility company to shut down electricity remotely.”). 
 63. See Brendan Cook et al., The Smart Meter and a Smarter Consumer: Quantifying the 
Benefits of Smart Meter Implementation in the United States, CHEMISTRY CENT. J., Apr. 2012, at 
1, 5 (“A primary goal of smart meter implementation is to better know the demand of every 
consumer, in order to adapt the supply of electricity. The introduction of various informatics 
devices has made this possible.”); The Smart Home, supra  note 47 (“The Smart Grid, with its 
System of controls and smart meters, will help to effectively connect all these mini-power 
generating systems to the grid, to provide data about their operation to utilities and owners, and 
to know what surplus energy is feeding back into the grid versus being used on site.”). 
 64. See Harvey, supra note 10, at 2073–74 (“Enhanced monitoring of the location and 
timing of electricity needs will also mean utilities will be able to better reduce line loss—energy 
lost in transmission or distribution—and avoid the need for excess generation to ensure demand 
is met.”); Megan McLean, Note, How Smart is Too Smart?: How Privacy Concerns Threaten 
Modern Energy Infrastructure, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 879, 884 (2016). 
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consumption patterns.65 The goal is for consumers to shift some of the 
electricity usage to earlier or later times in the day to reduce the need to 
bring more power plants online at peak usage, reducing the cost of 
providing the power.66  
For those consumers who wish to understand their energy usage, there 
are two basic approaches. First, many utilities enable their customers to 
view their energy usage on the utility website.67 The clarity and detail of 
these utility-provided portals tend to vary greatly.68 Second, third-party 
companies are starting to develop platforms for consumers to see and 
manage their electricity usage at home through in-home displays and 
home energy-management systems.69 These home systems allow 
consumers to manage their energy consumption independently and 
understand whether peak demand is occurring at any given time.70  
The idea of having individual consumers shift their behavior in 
response to minute-by-minute changes in electricity pricing sounds 
somewhat fanciful; few consumers are likely to pay this much attention 
to their electricity-consumption decisions.71 But this is where smart 
 
 65. EISEN ET AL., supra note 25, at 901 (“A smart meter could also show the real-time price 
of electricity, and help consumers save money. Demand for electricity peaks at various times 
during the typical day. Using a smart meter, a consumer could time shift and lower her electricity 
usage when demand and prices are high.”); C. Aswin Raj et al., Smart Meter Based on Real Time 
Pricing, 21 PROCEDIA TECH. 120, 120, 124 (2015). 
 66. Luis I. Minchala-Avila et al., Design and Implementation of a Smart Meter with 
Demand Response Capabilities, 103 ENERGY PROCEDIA 195, 195 (2016) (“Peak load reduction 
through an interactive reaction of the loads installed at the customer premises, e.g. turn on 
schedulable loads when cheap generation is available, increases network reliability and produce 
significant economic savings to the utility and the customers.”). 
 67. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., AN ASSESSMENT OF INTERVAL DATA AND THEIR POTENTIAL 
APPLICATION TO RESIDENTIAL ELECTRICITY END-USE MODELING 7 (2015) (describing the Green 
Button Initiative).  
 68. See id. at 22. 
 69. Cheryl Dancey Balough, Privacy Implications of Smart Meters, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
161, 166–67 (2011). One example of this product is the Energy Cloud by Blue Line Innovations. 
It reads a smart meter via the meter’s infrared port. See Easy Do-It-Yourself Installation, supra 
note 57. It claims to be compatible with the vast majority of smart meter types, but no statistics 
are available. See Compatible Meters, supra note 57. Commonwealth Edison (ComEd), the utility 
serving the Chicago metro area provides a customer guide for linking in-home displays to the 
ComEd smart meter. See Smart Meter Connected Devices Service: Customer Guide, COMED, 
https://www.comed.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/SmartEnergy/SMCD_CustomerGuide.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5TYU-Y5QW]. The service allows customers “to receive energy usage and 
estimated cost information from ComEd through a smart device that is wirelessly connected with 
the smart meter” on the home. Id.  
 70. A.F.A. Aziz et al., Artificial Intelligent Meter Development Based on Advanced 
Metering Infrastructure Technology, 27 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REVS. 191, 195 
(2013).  
 71. See Chris Mooney, Why 50 Million Smart Meters Still Haven’t Fixed America’s Energy 
Habits, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2015, 1:45 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-
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homes and smart devices can play a critical role. What if your thermostat 
knew it was cheaper to cool down your home in the morning as opposed 
to the afternoon, when it is hotter and more air-conditioning units are 
running?72 Or what if your dishwasher knew it would be cheaper to run 
now as opposed to in an hour?73 Much power is consumed by these kinds 
of consumer appliances, and even now product manufacturers are trying 
to integrate them with smart home hubs and smart meters.74 Smart home 
hubs and smart appliances can respond to signals from utilities.75 In fact, 
“[t]here is an extensive interest on remote monitoring of [smart meters] 
to increase the grid management and metering security.”76 Even if no 
consumers ever look at their smart meter data, their homes could learn to 
take advantage of the information provided by the meters to save the 
homeowners money and the grid electricity. 
 
environment/wp/2015/01/29/americans-are-this-close-to-finally-understanding-their-electricity-
bills/ [https://perma.cc/8QS2-SEUA] (describing how a lack of transparency inhibits behavioral 
change). But see Mikko Tuomisto, Non-Intrusive Appliance Load Monitoring (NIALM) System 
with the Possibility for Users to Follow the Consumption of Individual Electricity Appliances from 
the Calendar, 5 INT’L J. ENERGY & POWER ENGINEERING 129, 130–31 (2016) (describing a tool 
that would allow consumers to help identify unique device activity to better track electricity 
consumption in their homes). 
 72. See, e.g., Ashley Carman, Nest’s Thermostat Will Now Adjust Itself Based on Time-of-
Use Rates, VERGE (June 21, 2016, 11:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/circuitbreaker/2016/6/ 
21/11987378/nest-thermostat-update-time-of-savings-save-money [https://perma.cc/K5EB-VFCD] 
(“Now the company is launching a ‘Time of Savings’ feature that claims to save homeowners 
money by adjusting their house’s temperature based on time-of-use rate plans.”); see also 
Thermostat Incentive, COMED, https://www.comed.com/WaysToSave/ForYourHome/Pages/ 
ThermostatIncentive.aspx [https://perma.cc/LFR3-TW9K] (describing a program based on 
automatic time-use adjustment). 
 73. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 7, at 15–16 (describing how smart devices can allow 
for remote control of energy-intensive cycles); The Smart Home, supra note 47 (“Smart 
appliances will also be able to respond to signals from your energy provider to avoid using energy 
during times of peak demand.”). 
 74. PETER BRONSKI ET AL., ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., THE ECONOMICS OF DEMAND 
FLEXIBILITY: HOW “FLEXIWATTS” CREATE QUANTIFIABLE VALUE FOR CUSTOMERS AND THE GRID 
5 (2015), https://rmi.org/insight/the-economics-of-demand-flexibility-how-flexiwatts-create-
quantifiable-value-for-customers-and-the-grid/ [https://perma.cc/YY7B-ZSWS] (pointing out 
that time shifting on uses such as air conditioning, water heating, and electric-vehicle charging 
could meaningfully lower peak usage without harming domestic-device productivity). 
 75. Minchala-Avila et al., supra note 66, at 196 (“[Smart meters] integrate the ability to 
remotely manage loads at the end-user premises by monitoring and controlling the customer’s 
devices and appliances.”); The Smart Home, supra note 47 (describing how an energy 
management system can be programmed to help limit use during peak periods). 
 76. Yasin Kabalci, A Survey on Smart Metering and Smart Grid Communication, 57 
RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REVS. 302, 308 (2016).  
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To encourage use of these automatic-management features, many 
utilities currently offer “demand response” programs,77 which enable 
consumers to play a role in balancing the electric grid “by reducing or 
shifting their electricity usage” to different times of the day.78 Some 
programs utilize pricing information to incentivize their customers to 
shift their energy usage themselves, others utilize “direct load control 
programs,” which allow the utility to remotely cycle air conditioners, 
thermostats, or water heaters on and off during peak periods of demand.79 
The majority of existing programs require active customer participation, 
but in the future utilities will be able to assist consumers in shifting their 
energy usage by utilizing “intelligent load management schemes” that 
automatically disconnect loads from power when it is “necessary or 
convenient.”80 These “[o]ptimal scheduling strategies” will enable 
utilities using home energy management systems to turn on or off home 
appliances including air-conditioning units, water heaters, washing 
machines and dryers, microwaves, computers, and more.81 While most 
appliances in homes today are not yet capable of being remotely 
controlled, utilities and manufacturers are working to make appliances 
“smart” and able to participate in demand response initiatives.82  
 
 77. FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND RESPONSE & ADVANCED 
METERING 21 (2011) (defining “demand response” as “[c]hanges in electric use by demand-side 
resources from their normal consumption patterns in response to changes in the price of electricity, 
or to incentive payments designed to induce lower electricity use at times of high wholesale 
market prices or when system reliability is jeopardized”). 
 78. Demand Response, OFF. ELECTRICITY, https://www.energy.gov/oe/activities/ 
technology-development/grid-modernization-and-smart-grid/demand-response [https://perma.cc/ 
VXB7-EAGW]. 
 79. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 7, at 15 (“Customers received incentives for 
allowing utilities to use DLC devices to control various types of appliances and equipment—such 
as air conditioners, water heaters, and swimming pool and irrigation pumps—to reduce peak 
demands.”); Demand Response, supra note 78; Herman K. Trabish, The New Demand Response 
and the Future of the Power Sector, UTIL. DIVE (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.utilitydive.com/ 
news/the-new-demand-response-and-the-future-of-the-power-sector/512134/ [https://perma.cc/ 
9W9V-CWVW]. 
 80. Sean Barker et al., SmartCap: Flattening Peak Electricity Demand in Smart Homes, 
2012 IEEE INT’L CONF. ON PERVASIVE COMPUTING & COMM. 67, 67; see also Trabish, supra note 
79 (“Nearly everything has a chip in it now . . . . If it is controllable, it can help support the grid.” 
(quoting Carly Sorrentino, Spokesperson, Advanced Microgrid Sys.)).  
 81. Hussain Shareef et al., Review on Home Energy Management System Considering 
Demand Responses, Smart Technologies, and Intelligent Controllers, 6 IEEE ACCESS 24,498, 
24,503–04 (2018), https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=8352822 
[https://perma.cc/5AL2-4JM5]. 
 82. Barker et al., supra note 80, at 68; see Keith Barry, Whirlpool’s New Connected 
Appliances Simplify the Smart Grid, REVIEWED, https://www.reviewed.com/laundry/features/ 
whirlpools-new-connected-appliances-simplify-the-smart-grid [https://perma.cc/7XYY-QTSD] 
(last updated Sept. 12, 2015) (“Appliances equipped with Whirlpool’s 6th Sense Live can 
automatically run when power is cheapest.”).  
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Finally, smart meters enable the increased use of renewable-energy 
and storage technologies on the grid. Historically, the conventional grid 
was unidirectional: electricity moved from the power plants outward 
through the transmission and distribution system to industrial sites, 
commercial businesses, and residential homes.83 This arrangement of the 
electric grid was effective until the development of distributed energy 
resources (DERs),84 which include renewable sources of power such as 
solar panels or wind turbines that are installed at the customer site instead 
of the utility plant. The placement of DERs at the “end” of the traditional 
electric grid required the development of a system that could move 
electricity “bi-directionally,” enabling the DERs to move electricity onto 
the grid instead of simply receiving it from the grid.85 Moreover, the 
interval-level data that smart meters provide also enables the integration 
of DERs onto the grid and may help utilities better “predict the behavior 
of customer-sited energy resources so that these resources can be utilized 
more efficiently.”86 In the future, smart meters could help utilities decide 
whether to bring online a new power plant or instead utilize battery 
storage or other DERs located at consumer sites to meet increasing 
electricity demands.87 
Smart meters already bring clear benefits for both utilities and the 
public, and they represent a promising area for consumer participation 
and increased efficiency in the future. Overall, the savings that follow 
from a better understanding of electricity demand and the potential for 
peak load shifting “can significantly reduce national energy use and curb 
energy emissions while addressing pressing geopolitical and 
 
 83. Kabalci, supra note 76, at 304. 
 84. See MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, UTILITY OF THE FUTURE 2 (2016) (“DERs include demand 
response, generation, energy storage, and energy control devices, if they are located and function 
at the distribution level.”).  
 85. Kabalci, supra note 76, at 309 (“One of the most important achievements in smart grid 
is AMI system that is used to measure, acquire, and analyze the data about energy consumption 
and power quality of each consumer. . . . The bidirectional communication is performed between 
utility supplier and consumer to improve maintenance, demand management, and planning 
capability of supplier.”).  
 86. COOPER, supra 47, at 5. Oracle has partnered with EnergyHub to create a product that 
will help utilities connect with and potentially control DERs in customer homes in their service 
territories. “EnergyHub’s platform gives utilities deep insight and control of these edge-of-grid 
assets, allowing the utility to understand where a DER is located on the grid, forecasting the 
behavior of that DER, and allowing the utility to manage these devices to provide grid services.” 
Stephen Hill, Opower and EnergyHub Form a Smart Partnership, OPOWER BLOG SERIES (Oct. 
22, 2019), https://blogs.oracle.com/utilities/opower-and-energyhub-form-a-smart-partnership-v3 
[https://perma.cc/CN75-V7TZ]. 
 87. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 7, at 52 (“Looking to the future, AMI can contribute 
to advanced concepts like vehicle-to-grid applications where utilities can have access to EV 
storage capacity for meeting system needs.”).  
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environmental concerns related to energy security and sustainability.”88 
But there are also risks associated with this information revolution. Smart 
meters generate significant amounts of data on what is occurring within 
residential homes, which have privacy implications as technology 
continues to progress in this area.  
B.  Risks Posed by Interval-Level Smart Meter Data 
Smart meters record interval-level data on residential electricity 
usage, transmit the usage to the utility, and can receive communications 
from the smart grid including “real-time energy prices [and] remote 
commands” from the utility.89 They can record electricity-usage data at 
an extremely precise level, with different systems using hourly, fifteen-
minute, and five-minute increments.90 “Because of its time granularity, 
smart meter data shows not only how much electricity is being used 
within a home but also at what time.”91 Prior to the installation of a smart 
meter, residential consumers were receiving a single total amount 
representing their electricity usage over the length of a month.92 Now, 
consumers’ energy usage is tracked in thousands of data points per 
month.93 From this highly detailed data, one can even potentially 
determine which individual appliances and devices are being used at any 
given time within a consumer’s home.94 Previously, energy-consumption 
records were not all that useful to others or dangerous to privacy. Now 
that has changed. 
By looking at smart meter data in short intervals of time, it is possible 
to identify which individual appliances are being used at any given time 
 
 88. Horne et al., supra note 51, at 65. 
 89. BRANDON J. MURRILL ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42338, SMART METER DATA: 
PRIVACY AND CYBERSECURITY 1 (2012).  
 90. Klass & Wilson, supra note 12, at 1105 (“Utilities can collect data subhourly (e.g., 
five-, fifteen-, or thirty-minute intervals), hourly, daily, or monthly and choose whether or not to 
share it, with whom to share it, and in what format to make it available.”).  
 91. Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation & Privacy International in 
Support of Plaintiff-Appellant Naperville Smart Meter Awareness & Reversal, supra note 39, at 
6–7 (“Thus, smart meter data is both qualitatively and quantitatively different from analog meter 
data—shifting from ‘one data point reflecting average monthly use’ to between 750 and 8,640 
‘distinct and time-stamped data points per month that reflect actual energy use’ at any given 
time.”). 
 92. See supra notes 37–39. 
 93. Supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 94. MURRILL ET AL., supra note 89, at 1–2; Kabalci, supra note 76, at 309 (“One of the most 
important achievements in smart grid is AMI system that is used to measure, acquire, and analyze 
the data about energy consumption and power quality of each consumer.”); Eoghan McKenna et 
al., Smart Meter Data: Balancing Consumer Privacy Concerns with Legitimate Applications, 41 
ENERGY POL’Y 807, 808 (2012) (“The ability to detect specific activities, however, depends on 
the time resolution of the consumption data.”).  
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because each appliance “generates a unique electric load ‘signature.’”95 
The load signatures of appliances are recorded by smart meters and a 
consumer’s energy usage over time can allow for analysis of daily load 
profiles “due to spikes corresponding to the switching on and off [of] 
electrical appliances such as a cooker, kettle, iron, microwave, washing 
machine[,] etc.”96 This kind of individual appliance information can 
reveal consumers’ “daily schedules (including times when they are at or 
away from home or asleep), whether their homes are equipped with alarm 
systems, whether they own expensive electronic equipment such as 
plasma TVs, and whether they use certain types of medical equipment.”97 
Moreover, more appliance manufacturers are starting to make smart 
appliances—those that are able to connect to and communicate with 
smart meters.98 Currently, this represents only a moderate threat to 
privacy because though overall energy-usage data already reveals much, 
disaggregation of the data to reveal everything is still difficult. In the 
future though, there will be an even greater threat because smart network 
integration will make it much easier to disaggregate individual appliances 
from the overall load. 
  
 
 95. MURRILL ET AL., supra note 89, at 4. 
 96. GRZEGORZ DUDEK ET AL., ANALYSIS OF SMART METER DATA FOR ELECTRICITY 
CONSUMERS (2018) (“Load density profiles inform about the distribution of the customer load in 
a given time period. They can be used for comparison the variability of the consumer in different 
period of the year or in different days of the week. We can also compare different customers using 
their density profiles.”).  
 97. MURRILL ET AL., supra note 89, at 4 (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DATA ACCESS AND 
PRIVACY ISSUES RELATED TO SMART GRID TECHNOLOGIES 2 (2010)). 
 98. Balough, supra note 69, at 166 (“The appliances continually send their energy usage, 
labeled as consumed by that appliance, to the smart meter. The smart meter reads that 
communication from all smart appliances and can generate a load signature for each home.”). 
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Figure 1: A Household’s Power Demand as Measured with 




































 99. Oliver Parson, Unsupervised Training Methods for Non-Intrusive Appliance Load 
Monitoring from Smart Meter Data 63 fig.6.1(a) (Apr. 2014) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 
University of Southampton), https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/364263/1/Parson-thesis.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/35P3-NVVY]. 
 100. Oliver Parson, PhD Work, http://www.oliverparson.co.uk/phd-work [https://perma 
.cc/R4V9-LMY5] (last updated Jan. 9, 2014, 6:53 AM). This Figure was generated using hidden 
Markov modeling to identify individual devices from nonintrusive load monitoring. See Parson 
et al., supra note 8, at 4, for more information on this process.  
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The interconnectedness of smart meters and smart devices creates an 
opportunity for increased insight and efficiency.101 In addition to 
appliance manufacturers working to develop smart appliances that will 
interface with smart meters, other companies such as Google, General 
Electric, and Cisco are also working to create products that will help 
consumers better analyze their smart meter data and energy 
consumption.102 All of these developments are occurring concurrently 
with the development of smart speakers, smart digital assistants, and 
other smart devices in the home that can be connected to or integrated 
with the home energy management system.103 Google, Apple, and 
Amazon are also partnering with other companies to link their voice-
operated products with the smart-appliance ecosystems, which currently 
includes home assistants, smart TVs, smart speakers, smart lights, and 
smart thermostats.104 As it stands, “[a]bout 60% of Amazon Echo and 
Google Home users have at least one household accessory, such as a 
thermostat, security system, or appliance, connected to them,”105 and 
these companies are working to achieve ever-greater levels of integration 
across their smart device product lines.106 Linking all of this consumer 
 
 101. Shareef et al., supra note 81, at 24,501. 
Several enabling smart technologies result in the integration of intelligent [home 
energy management systems] with various functions inside homes, such as 
automatic control, connection to the utility by a smart meter, and minimized 
energy consumption. With smart technologies, customers can control household 
appliances, optimize electricity consumption, and set a schedule for household 
appliances during critical peak hours based on the DR signals. (footnote omitted). 
See supra note 54 (describing an Ohio utility’s app that leverages interconnectivity for energy 
management and a similar Detroit program). The companies Bidgely and EnergyHub are 
partnering to disaggregate home energy data for more than fifteen home energy device brands. 
This will allow them to provide customized household and appliance-level data for each home. 
Julian Spector, Bidgely and EnergyHub Team Up to Combine Home Energy Data with Controls, 
GREENTECH MEDIA (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/bidgely-
and-energyhub-team-up-to-combine-home-energy-data-with-controls [https://perma.cc/T79Q-
Z8ER]. 
 102. Harvey, supra note 10, at 2074.  
 103. See Allegra Bianchini, Note, Always On, Always Listening: Navigating Fourth 
Amendment Rights in a Smart Home, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 1, 6–7 (2018) 
(“Integration to control lightbulbs, smart meters, and phone apps, like Uber, allows nearly 
complete virtual control of a user’s home, and the possibility of more capabilities is limited only 
by programmers’ imaginations.” (footnote omitted)). 
 104. Brian Dumaine, It Might Get Loud: Inside Silicon Valley’s Battle to Own Voice Tech, 
FORTUNE (Oct. 24, 2018), http://fortune.com/longform/amazon-google-apple-voice-recognition/ 
[https://perma.cc/28KW-NXZK]. 
 105. Id.  
 106. Apple, Amazon, and Google are partnering to create a single standard for smart-home 
products. This will enable more connections between smart devices such as lights, thermostats, 
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data to the smart meter installed in the home would basically invite these 
companies to sit in your home and to watch, listen, and record everything 
that you do. And as more utilities partner with tech companies to facilitate 
the connection between these devices, the higher the risk that consumer 
energy-consumption data will be easily accessed and sold.  
Though this fully “smart home” may be far off in the future, these tech 
companies are already looking for ways to expand their internet-
connected devices to attain information on consumers’ personal energy 
use in the home.107 Google already has partnerships with utilities and 
power providers in Illinois, California, and Texas, while Amazon has 
partnered with EDF Energy in the United Kingdom and Arcadia Power 
in the United States to provide a bundle of home devices that enable better 
energy management.108 The movement of tech companies in the 
consumer-energy space represents an area of heightened privacy risks.  
As of today, utilities are the primary recipient of smart meter data, but 
the amount and kind of information now collected will be useful to many 
other parties.109 Moreover, with the continued development of the smart 
grid and greater emphasis on energy-efficiency programs at the customer 
level, utilities will likely struggle to decide which third-party vendors 
should have access to the smart meter data.110 Third-party vendors are 
already seeking access to this data to help them identify potential 
customers, learn which products are used most in a home, and market 
 
and other electronic devices in the home. Ben Gilbert, In a Rare Move, Apple, Amazon, and 
Google Just Announced a Major Partnership, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 18, 2019), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/apple-amazon-google-partner-on-smart-home-tech-2019-12 
[https://perma.cc/CR7A-YD2X]. 
 107. See Bradley Olson, Google, Amazon Seek Foothold in Electricity as Home Automation 
Grows, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 27, 2019, 6:44 PM), https://www.wsj.com/amp/articles/google-amazon-
seek-foothold-in-electricity-as-home-automation-grows-11548604800 [https://perma.cc/G3WJ-
PJFR]. 
 108. Id.; see EDF Energy Launches Voice Controlled Energy Accounts with Amazon Alexa, 
EE ONLINE (Sept. 15, 2016), https://electricenergyonline.com/article/organization/28120/ 
596851/EDF-Energy-launches-voice-controlled-energy-accounts-with-Amazon-Alexa.htm 
[https://perma.cc/VB4Z-BLX6] (“EDF Energy’s collaboration with Amazon is part of the 
company’s commitment to making energy easy and putting customers in control through 
connected home technologies and other innovative products and services, such as its smart 
thermostat HeatSmart, and the Show Me Your Bill functionality in its app.”). 
 109. John R. Forbush, Comment, Regulating the Use and Sharing of Energy Consumption 
Data: Assessing California’s SB 1476 Smart Meter Privacy Statute, 75 ALB. L. REV. 341, 342 
(2012) (“The potential for utilities and other vendors to collect and aggregate energy consumption 
data from individual homes and businesses raises significant questions about the access, use, and 
ownership of energy consumption information.”). 
 110. Balough, supra note 69, at 169 (“Companies that manufacturer [sic] home [energy 
management systems] and in-home display systems are actively marketing their products to 
utilities for distribution to the electric company’s residential customers.”).  
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their products to targeted groups of people.111 These companies could 
also help develop interfaces for consumers to better understand and 
manage their energy consumption. “Because myriad other systems that 
will interact with smart meters have yet to be designed, one cannot fully 
predict the types and amounts of personally identifiable information that 
will be monitored or collected.”112 
Law enforcement agencies will also be interested in accessing this 
data and there is at least one case where a police department accessed 
smart meter data following a murder.113 In future cases, electricity-
consumption data can be expected to be even more indicative of activities 
occurring in the home. The problem facing consumers now is 
“[i]nformation that previously required surveillance and constant 
monitoring, such as when users are home, their day-to-day schedules, 
which room of the house they are in at what time, and how often they use 
certain appliances and security, [will] now [be] conveniently logged into 
a record.”114 Both third-party companies and law enforcement agencies 
will be particularly motivated to access that record to attain more 
information about the consumers and their homes.  
As this Part has demonstrated, smart grid developments can help 
consumers reduce their energy consumption and make the electric grid 
more efficient. But smart meters, working in conjunction with smart 
appliances and other smart devices in the home, convey a significant 
amount of private consumer data to utilities and potentially to their 
energy efficiency partners. Instead of gathering one data point on energy 
consumption per month, utilities are now gathering thousands of data 
points from a consumer’s home, which can expose a wide variety of 
otherwise private activities.  
II.  PRIVACY PROTECTIONS AND THE EVOLVING MODERN HOME 
This Part uses the lens of Fourth Amendment law to analyze the 
privacy implications of the smart meter revolution. It begins by analyzing 
the challenges of extending privacy protection to information that is 
necessarily shared with third parties and the role of the home as a 
constitutional trump card in the Fourth Amendment analysis. It then 
applies the traditional Fourth Amendment tests to the problem of smart 
 
 111. See Harvey, supra note 10, at 2079 (“Third-party researchers and companies are seeking 
access to this data in order to identify customers, enhance product design, and conduct more in-
depth analysis of energy consumption. For example, a company could use AMI data to identify 
potential customers that could benefit from energy efficiency upgrades. That company could then 
market products and services tailored specifically for those individual customers.” (footnote 
omitted)).  
 112. Balough, supra note 69, at 167. 
 113. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 114. Bianchini, supra note 103, at 7.  
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meters, ultimately concluding that the use of private smart meter data for 
law enforcement purposes does implicate Fourth Amendment 
protections. It closes by using information-privacy cases of Whalen v. 
Roe and NASA v. Nelson to consider the constitutional reasonableness of 
smart meter data collection for non-law enforcement purposes, such as 
when the government is acting in the role of a public utility. 
Smart meters highlight a growing tension in this area. The normal 
Fourth Amendment intuition is that you, as an individual, have no 
expectation of privacy in the records of companies with which you do 
business.115 Yet at the same time, a growing body of Fourth Amendment 
case law has softened previously fixed antiprivacy rules in the face of 
advancing technology and the increasing ease with which a significant 
amount of intimate data can be collected.116 And, with smart meters, there 
is the additional complication of the role of the home, which is 
traditionally the most protected physical location for Fourth Amendment 
purposes.117 Though this Article’s ultimate focus is broader than 
government information gathering, the standards of the Fourth 
Amendment help illuminate the fundamental challenge of smart meter—
and general smart home—technology. 
An important nuance in the energy domain is the multiple roles that 
the government may play. In the United States, there are both privately 
owned utilities, which include investor-owned utilities and rural electric-
cooperative associations, and publicly owned utilities, which include 
federal power systems such as the Tennessee Valley Authority and public 
power systems such as the Los Angeles Department of Water and 
Power.118 The Fourth Amendment only applies directly to publicly 
owned utilities, which have been estimated to make up about 67% of the 
utilities in the United States but only serve about 15% of electric 
customers.119 Private investor-owned utilities are primarily regulated by 
 
 115. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018). 
 116. See generally, e.g., id. (protecting cell phone location records); Riley v. California, 573 
U.S. 373 (2014) (protecting cell phones from warrantless searches); United States v. Jones, 565 
U.S. 400 (2012) (prohibiting the installation of a GPS tracker on a private vehicle).  
 117. See Jonathan L. Hafetz, “A Man’s Home Is His Castle?”: Reflections on the Home, the 
Family, and Privacy During the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, 8 WM. & MARY 
J. WOMEN & L. 175, 175–76 (2002). 
 118. See EISEN ET AL., supra note 25, at 71–72; Differences Between Publicly and Investor-
Owned Utilities, CAL. ENERGY COMMISSION, https://ww2.energy.ca.gov/pou_reporting/back 
ground/difference_pou_iou.html [https://perma.cc/52W2-XPRF]. 
 119. See Stats and Facts, AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N, https://www.publicpower.org/public-
power/stats-and-facts [https://perma.cc/6BY8-EVZG]; Today in Energy, U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN. (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=40913 [https://perma 
.cc/ZD77-8AGL].  
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state public-utility commissions, but privacy regulations can vary 
dramatically state by state.120  
Depending on where one lives, therefore, one’s energy provider might 
be a government entity—a public or semi-public utility—or a private 
corporation. If the utility is a private company, then the Fourth 
Amendment question is whether you have an expectation of privacy in 
that company’s records. This implicates the “third-party doctrine.” If the 
utility is public, however, then two separate questions arise: First, 
whether the government can insist on the installation of a smart meter on 
a home—the meter itself could be a Fourth Amendment search—and, 
second, whether there is a Fourth Amendment problem with the “utility” 
portion of the government sharing information with the “law 
enforcement” portion of the government. We believe that the ultimate 
Fourth Amendment answer should be the same for public and private 
utilities—that people do have an expectation of privacy in energy-usage 
records and that the government should be required to obtain a warrant if 
it wishes to access those records for law enforcement purposes. But we 
shall begin with the private-utility case before complicating our analysis 
by considering the implications of a public utility. 
A.  The Third-Party Doctrine 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the people’s right to be free from 
“unreasonable searches and seizures.”121 The current test for whether a 
particular investigative action implicates the Fourth Amendment is given 
in Justice John Harlan’s concurrence to Katz v. United States.122 This test 
requires that the person being searched by the police have a subjective 
expectation of privacy in the place or thing being searched and that this 
expectation be objectively reasonable.123 Once it is determined that a 
search implicates the Fourth Amendment, a court then must determine if 
the search or seizure is itself reasonable, thus reasonableness enters the 
analysis twice.124 In the law enforcement context, the search of a private 
space for law enforcement purposes is reasonable if the government agent 
has a warrant from an independent magistrate or if one of the numerous 
exceptions to the warrant requirement applies.125  
The Fourth Amendment has historically granted no protection for 
information that people voluntarily share with third parties, including not 
only friends but also private companies.126 The government’s acquisition 
 
 120. See, e.g., Differences Between Publicly and Investor-Owned Utilities, supra note 118. 
 121. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 122. 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 123. See id. at 361. 
 124. See, e.g., Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 187–88 (2004). 
 125. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018). 
 126. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). 
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of this information is not considered a “search” for Fourth Amendment 
purposes and therefore courts do not even reach the question of whether 
the acquisition is reasonable; the information is treated as having been 
completely nonsecret.127 In its most basic form, this “third-party 
doctrine” is unexceptional. Police informants and coconspirators-turned-
informants regularly reveal information to the government that was 
entrusted to them by another. In the words of Justice Potter Stewart 
writing in the seminal case of Hoffa v. United States,128 “Neither this 
Court nor any member of it has ever expressed the view that the Fourth 
Amendment protects a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to 
whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.”129 Thus, 
the law assumes that as soon as you impart a private piece of information 
to another, it is no longer considered private information under the Fourth 
Amendment.  
Though few object to the idea of allowing criminals to betray their 
former confederates, support for the third-party doctrine frays 
substantially when the same principle is applied to the business records 
that law-abiding companies hold on criminal suspects.130 And it is easy 
to see why this application is controversial. The doctrine removes from 
Fourth Amendment protection huge swathes of otherwise private data 
that is collected by private companies on a regular basis. Were the 
traditional third-party doctrine to govern smart meter data, then the 
government could freely obtain this type of data from private utilities 
without a warrant. 
The origins of the business-records portion of the third-party doctrine 
can be found in two cases where the Supreme Court found no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in information recorded and stored by a private 
company. First, the Court in United States v. Miller131 held that there is 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in financial documents held by a 
bank.132 “All of the documents obtained, including financial statements 
and deposit slips, contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the 
banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of 
business.”133 The depositors, the Court said, assume the risk that the bank 
 
 127. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 128. 385 U.S. 293 (1966). 
 129. Id. at 302; see also Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 465 (1963) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting in regards only to electronic eavesdropping) (“The risk of being overheard by an 
eavesdropper or betrayed by an informer . . . is probably inherent in the conditions of human 
society. It is the kind of risk we necessarily assume whenever we speak.”). 
 130. Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 563 (2009) 
(describing the third-party doctrine as “the Lochner of search and seizure law, widely criticized 
as profoundly misguided” (footnote omitted)). 
 131. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 132. See id. at 440–42. 
 133. Id. at 442. 
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will reveal their affairs to the government upon request.134 The innocent 
bank, like the guilty coconspirator, is perfectly free to expose the secrets 
of those who trusted it with their private financial information. Similarly, 
the Supreme Court found in Smith v. Maryland135 that individuals have 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed from their 
home telephones and thereby possessed by the telephone companies.136 
Again, the Court treated the private company as a potential informer, free 
to share its records with the government.137  
The timeline of this doctrine is interesting. The original informer cases 
were decided in the 1960s, and Smith and Miller are creations of the 
1970s. Much has changed since then. The amount and granularity of 
personal information that is collected by new forms of technology 
provides a significantly more intimate picture of individuals and their 
activities than did the technologies and habits of even two decades ago. 
The potential applications of the third-party doctrine are enumerable in 
modern society, especially with the addition of more devices that are used 
on an hourly basis. More and more commercial companies are 
recognizing the value in home energy-consumption data as a means of 
gathering information about their current and potential customers.  
The Supreme Court has not been blind to this digital revolution. The 
first truly qualitative shift in the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence in response to this development came in Riley v. 
California,138 which held that a cell phone cannot be searched incident to 
arrest absent a warrant or generally recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement.139 Existing case law had been read to allow warrantless 
searches of any and all physical containers in the arrested persons’ 
possession—items such as purses, wallets, and briefcases—incident to 
arrest.140 So arrested persons could expect a warrantless search of any 
personal papers that they were carrying, including opened mail, notes 
from old friends, and the like. And, before Riley, federal appellate courts 
frequently upheld warrantless searches of cell phones incident to arrest.141 
 
 134. See id. at 443. 
 135. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 136. Id. at 742.  
 137. See id. at 744–45. 
 138. 573 U.S. 373 (2014). 
 139. Id. at 393 (“Cell phones differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense from other 
objects that might be kept on an arrestee’s person.”).  
 140. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973) (contents of a cigarette pack); 
United States v. Carrion, 809 F.2d 1120, 1123, 1128 (5th Cir. 1987) (billfold and address book); 
United States v. Watson, 669 F.2d 1374, 1383–84 (11th Cir. 1982) (wallet); United States v. Lee, 
501 F.2d 890, 892 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (purse). 
 141. See, e.g., United States v. Curtis, 635 F.3d 704, 711–13 (5th Cir. 2011); United States 
v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405, 411–12 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259–60 
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In Riley, Chief Justice John Roberts likened the argument that cell 
phones were “materially indistinguishable” from briefcases to “saying a 
ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the 
moon. Both are ways of getting from point A to point B, but little else 
justifies lumping them together.”142 Cell phones simply contained too 
much information to treat them like physical papers.143 So the Court 
fashioned a bright-line rule: police must “get a warrant” to search a cell 
phone.144 This represented a substantial shift in Fourth Amendment law, 
and it was widely discussed as such in both the scholarly literature and 
the popular press.145  
The stakes and torches of this digital revolution reached the palaces 
of the third-party doctrine just four years later in Carpenter v. United 
States. There, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment 
extends to protect historical cell-site location information (CSLI) records 
from cell phones.146 These records are generated every time a cell phone 
connects to a cell tower, which most modern devices will attempt to do 
several times a minute.147 The data therefore has the potential to represent 
a moment-by-moment catalogue of a cell phone user’s movements.148 
The police in Carpenter had obtained a court order issued under the 
Stored Communications Act to access the CSLI records, but the Court 
held that this was insufficient.149 Even though CSLI is contained in the 
phone company’s own records, a warrant was required to access it.150 
Chief Justice Roberts’s majority in Carpenter noted two distinctions 
from prior case law, both important for this Article’s purposes. First, he 
explained that the conveyance of location information to cell phone 
 
(5th Cir. 2007); see also United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 809–10 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(permitting a limited cell phone search incident to arrest, while reserving the question of whether 
a more invasive search would have been permissible without a warrant). 
 142. Riley, 573 U.S. at 393. 
 143. See id. (“Modern cell phones, as a category, implicate privacy concerns far beyond 
those implicated by the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse.”). 
 144. Id. at 403. 
 145. See, e.g., Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Myth of Fourth Amendment 
Circularity, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1747, 1771–74 (2017); Paul Ohm, The Life of Riley (v. California), 
48 TEX. TECH L. REV. 133, 133, 134 (2015) (describing Riley as a “significant milestone in 
constitutional criminal procedure” and a “privacy opinion for the ages”); Orin Kerr, The Volokh 
Conspiracy: The Significance of Riley, WASH. POST (June 25, 2014, 11:56 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/06/25/the-significance-of-
riley/?utm_term=.d867005e9b0b [https://perma.cc/M3TF-W4J3] (“Riley can be fairly read as 
saying that computers are a game-changer: We’re now in a ‘digital age,’ and quantity of data and 
the ‘qualitatively different’ nature of at least some digital records changes how the Fourth 
Amendment should apply.”). 
 146. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018). 
 147. Id. at 2211. 
 148. See id.  
 149. Id. at 2221. 
 150. See id. 
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providers was not really “voluntary” because it did not require any 
affirmative act on the part of users “beyond powering up”151 and cell 
phones are now a ubiquitous part of daily life; carrying one is 
“indispensable to participation in modern society.”152 So, in Chief Justice 
Roberts’s view, any exposure of information that comes from merely 
carrying a phone is not truly voluntary as one cannot dispense with the 
“indispensable.” 
Second, Chief Justice Roberts placed great importance on the 
uniquely revealing nature of historical CSLI. Some forms of data are so 
“detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled” that additional 
protections under the Fourth Amendment are required.153 CSLI has the 
potential to reveal many of the privacies of life, including issues of great 
personal intimacy.154 He also recognized that accessing a person’s 
historic CSLI records presented “even greater privacy concerns” than 
prospective GPS monitoring because historical CSLI records give the 
government near-perfect location surveillance on a person, subject only 
to the five-year retention policies of most wireless carriers.155 Though 
CSLI was undoubtedly useful to law enforcement, “this tool risks 
Government encroachment of the sort the Framers, ‘after consulting the 
lessons of history,’ drafted the Fourth Amendment to prevent.”156  
This holding represented a sharp break from prior third-party doctrine 
jurisprudence, a point made vigorously in dissent by Justice Anthony 
Kennedy. He pointed out that, whatever the sensitivity of historical 
location data, the information at issue was fundamentally in records 
owned and controlled by a third party.157 He therefore would have treated 
the case as bound squarely by Smith and Miller, precedents that the 
majority notably did not overturn.158 He also challenged the notion that 
 
 151. Id. at 2220. 
 152. Id. 
 153. See id. at 2216–17. 
 154. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 396 (2014) (citing United States v. Jones, 565 
U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)); see also Jones, 565 U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor, 
J., concurring) (“GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public 
movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and 
sexual associations.”).  
 155. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218; see also id. at 2223 (“In light of the deeply revealing 
nature of CSLI, its depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach, and the inescapable and automatic 
nature of its collection, the fact that such information is gathered by a third party does not make 
it any less deserving of Fourth Amendment protection.”). 
 156. Id. at 2223 (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)). 
 157. See id. at 2231 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Cases like this one, where the Government 
uses court-approved compulsory process to obtain records owned and controlled by a third party, 
are governed by the two majority opinions in Miller and Smith.”).  
 158. Id. 
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CSLI was uniquely revealing.159 A person’s movements are, after all, 
generally in public spaces. Financial and telephone records, by contrast, 
might reveal more:  
What persons purchase and to whom they talk might disclose 
how much money they make; the political and religious 
organizations to which they donate; whether they have 
visited a psychiatrist, plastic surgeon, abortion clinic, or 
AIDS treatment center; whether they go to gay bars or 
straight ones; and who are their closest friends and family 
members.160 
This evolution of the third-party doctrine complicates the story for 
smart meter data in the hands of private companies. Twenty years ago, it 
would have been easy to argue that energy-consumption information, 
which is collected by utilities and is an essential part of their operations, 
is merely a collection of business records.161 The electricity bill is only 
one of many that is paid out of the family checking account, and Miller 
teaches that even the totality of the family accounts can be examined 
absent a warrant.162 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
reached exactly that conclusion on exactly that reasoning as recently as 
2012.163 “The records sought here are business records owned and 
possessed by [the utility]” and “[the utility’s] business records are no 
more inherently personal or private than the bank records in Miller.”164 
And the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit came to the same 
conclusion in 2011.165 In both the Eighth and Ninth Circuit cases, the 
underlying investigation was drug related.166 
But then the world changed. Part of that change is the introduction of 
smart meters. Suddenly they generate information hour by hour or minute 
by minute rather than month by month. And part of the change is in the 
legal rule. After Carpenter, the question is whether smart meter data is 
sufficiently involuntarily conveyed, sufficiently revealing, and 
 
 159. See id. at 2234 (“But the Court does not explain what makes something a distinct 
category of information.”). 
 160. Id. at 2232. 
 161. See State v. Kluss, 867 P.2d 247, 252 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993) (finding no expectation of 
privacy in utility records under federal or state constitutions). 
 162. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437–40 (1976). 
 163. See United States v. Golden Valley Elec. Ass’n, 689 F.3d 1108, 1116 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 164. Id. 
 165. See United States v. McIntyre, 646 F.3d 1107, 1111–12 (8th Cir. 2011) (“Similarly, 
when [McIntyre] used power in his home, he voluntarily conveyed that information to [Cedar–
Knox Public Power District].” (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Hamilton, 434 F. 
Supp. 2d 974, 979 (D. Or. 2006))). 
 166. See Golden Valley, 689 F.3d at 1111; McIntyre, 646 F.3d at 1110. 
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sufficiently unique to the new digital world to warrant becoming the 
second exception to the third-party doctrine. 
B.  Electronic Infiltration of the Home 
When considering whether smart meter data is sufficiently special to 
qualify for an exception to the third-party doctrine, we must consider the 
role of the home in modern Fourth Amendment law. Despite the Supreme 
Court’s assertion in Katz that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, 
not places,”167 emphasis has often been placed on the home. The home 
has been viewed as an especially private space by American privacy law 
since its founding. The Fourth Amendment was in part a response to 
British excesses such as “general warrants” and “writs of assistance” in 
the colonies,168 which allowed people and their homes to be searched 
without cause to believe they had committed an offense. Forced entry into 
a home and “rummaging around inside were understood as the 
paradigmatic examples of ‘searches.’”169  
This focus on location and, particularly, on the home has caused 
complications in several cases involving technological surveillance. In 
two cases from the 1980s, police officers installed electronic trackers 
(beepers) in containers of chemicals used in the production and 
processing of illegal drugs.170 Informants then sold those containers to 
suspected drug dealers so that the government could trace where the 
suspects had established their drug labs.171 In the first case, United States 
v. Knotts,172 the officers tracked the property when it was in the suspect’s 
car traveling over public roads.173 Ultimately, the container came to rest 
in a secluded cabin, which the police then raided.174 In the second case, 
United States v. Karo,175 the officers tracked the container through three 
houses and two storage facilities.176 
 
 167. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
 168. History and Scope of the Amendment: Search and Seizure: Fourth Amendment, JUSTIA, 
https://law.justia.com/constitution/us/amendment-04/01-search-and-seizure.html [https://perma. 
cc/Z7WX-RW84] (“In order to enforce the revenue laws, English authorities made use of writs 
of assistance, which were general warrants authorizing the bearer to enter any house or other place 
to search for and seize ‘prohibited and uncustomed’ goods, and commanding all subjects to assist 
in these endeavors.”). 
 169. Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth Amendment Searches, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 
67, 72. 
 170. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 708 (1984); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 
276, 277–78 (1983). 
 171. See Karo, 468 U.S. at 708; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278. 
 172. 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 173. Id. at 281. 
 174. Id. at 278–79. 
 175. 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
 176. Id. at 708–09. 
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In Knotts, the beeper tracking did not present a Fourth Amendment 
problem.177 Though the final destination was on private property, the 
beeper’s transit occurred entirely over public roads and so, to the Court, 
was therefore exposed to public view.178 The use of the beeper to track 
the location had been practically necessary—the police had difficulty 
monitoring the suspect’s car given his “evasive maneuvers”—but there 
was no inherent reason why naked-eye surveillance could not have 
obtained the same information.179 The Court later found distinguishable 
facts in Karo, however. There, the police repeatedly used the beeper to 
determine whether the incriminating container was still present in a 
private residence, a fact that they were having great difficulty otherwise 
observing.180 Though “[t]he monitoring of an electronic device such as a 
beeper is, of course, less intrusive than a full-scale search, but it does 
reveal a critical fact about the interior of the premises that the 
Government is extremely interested in knowing and that it could not have 
otherwise obtained without a warrant.”181 
This seems a somewhat curious distinction. One leaves a private 
residence on public roads, so the question of whether one is still in a house 
can generally be answered by watching the outside. But the Court was 
balancing two strong intuitions. The first is that public roads are generally 
public.182 The second is plainly expressed in Karo: “At the risk of 
belaboring the obvious, private residences are places in which the 
individual normally expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not 
authorized by a warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that society 
is prepared to recognize as justifiable.”183 And, several pages later, the 
Court noted that “[i]ndiscriminate monitoring of property that has been 
withdrawn from public view would present far too serious a threat to 
privacy interests in the home to escape entirely some sort of Fourth 
Amendment oversight.”184 
The very act of carrying the electronic surveillance device over the 
threshold into a private building, then, changes the character of its use. 
Checking the beeper before the container is carried into a building is 
perfectly permissible; you are tracking an object in public spaces. But, 
checking the beeper after to determine if it is still in the building is not 
permissible; you are monitoring a private space. A space so private, in 
fact, that it is “obvious” that the Fourth Amendment protects it. 
 
 177. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285. 
 178. Id. at 281–82. 
 179. Id. at 278, 285.  
 180. Karo, 468 U.S. at 714–15. 
 181. Id. at 715.  
 182. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281 (“A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares 
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.”). 
 183. Karo, 468 U.S. at 714 (emphasis added). 
 184. Id. at 716. 
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The Supreme Court similarly recognized the importance of protecting 
homes from enhanced surveillance made possible by advancing 
technology in Kyllo v. United States.185 There the Court held that the 
government cannot use a thermal imager outside of a home to explore 
what is happening inside the home because doing so would leave 
homeowners “at the mercy of advancing technology.”186 At the time of 
the Court’s decision, thermal imagers were not widely used by the 
public.187 The Court found that the simple act of collecting thermal 
images of the home while standing outside of it constituted a search under 
the Fourth Amendment even if the person observing the home did not 
enter the property.188  
The technology used in Kyllo was fairly primitive.189 “The scan 
showed that the roof over the garage and a side wall of petitioner’s home 
were relatively hot compared to the rest of the home and substantially 
warmer than neighboring homes in the triplex.”190 This was useful for 
detecting use of halide lights in a marijuana farm but did not reveal much 
about the other activities of the home’s occupants.191 Nevertheless, the 
Court looked ahead at technologies then being developed which might 
allow thermal imaging “through-the-wall” and would therefore reveal the 
movements of people inside a house.192 Thinking of what technology 
would potentially soon enable substantially eased the majority’s decision. 
C.  The Fourth Amendment and Private Smart Meter Data 
The forward-looking concern evident in Kyllo returns us to smart 
meters. First consider the common case where a private utility has 
information about electricity consumption and the government wants to 
obtain that information for law enforcement purposes. As discussed in 
Part I, smart meters can convey a significant amount of information about 
the activities that occur within a home if the data is properly 
disaggregated. “Granular AMI data presents a potential new tool for law 
enforcement to investigate a much broader set of crimes or even track 
people’s whereabouts.”193 Even given the current state of the technology, 
 
 185. 533 U.S. 27, 35–36 (2001). 
 186. Id. 
 187. See id. at 40. The holding seemed to rest primarily on the public’s access to advanced 
technology but also recognized the importance of protecting the home. Id. (“Where, as here, the 
Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that 
would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ 
and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”).  
 188. See id. 
 189. See id. at 36 (“[T]he technology used in the present case was relatively crude . . . .”). 
 190. Id. at 30. 
 191. See id.  
 192. See id. at 36. 
 193. Harvey, supra note 10, at 2082.  
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it is already possible to tell a fair amount about household occupancy 
patterns, and tech companies are working hard to connect smart devices 
together.194 As technology advances and more devices are directly linked 
to smart meters, the ability of utilities and potentially other companies to 
deduce a family’s behaviors in the home will only increase. As one writer 
put it, “[T]he digitization of just about everything is not just possible but 
likely, and that now is the time to be freaking out about the dangers.”195  
The central tenet in Fourth Amendment law is “the right of a man to 
retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable 
government intrusion.”196 A person’s expectation of privacy is highest in 
the home, but smart meters risk exposing intimate details of daily life 
simply by gathering energy-consumption data in small intervals of time. 
In Kyllo, the Supreme Court started in the right direction by stating that 
“obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the 
interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without 
physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,’ constitutes a 
search.”197 Noting that “the Fourth Amendment draws ‘a firm line at the 
entrance to the house,’” the Court reaffirmed that line by requiring a 
“clear specification of those methods of surveillance that require a 
warrant.”198  
In one sense, smart meters fit well within the bounds of Kyllo; they 
are a new technology that allows for the cataloging and potential 
surveillance of intimate details within the home. And, unlike Kyllo, the 
privacy-penetrating possibilities of this technology are already realized. 
Even current smart meter data tells you quite a lot about a household.199 
Kyllo, however, emphasized that the technology in question was not in 
“general public use,”200 and smart meters are increasingly common by 
contrast. Utilities often either mandate smart meter installation or make 
it quite difficult to opt out of it, so the share of customers using smart 
meters can only be expected to increase.201 But as the near-compulsory 
 
 194. Farhad Manjoo, A Future Where Everything Becomes a Computer Is as Creepy as You 
Feared, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/10/technology/future-
internet-of-things.html?emc=edit_nn_20181011&nl=morning-briefing&nlid=85811686201810 
11&te=1 [https://perma.cc/Q2RF-UYFA] (“Cars, door locks, contact lenses, clothes, toasters, 
refrigerators, industrial robots, fish tanks, sex toys, light bulbs, toothbrushes, motorcycle 
helmets—these and other everyday objects are all on the menu for getting ‘smart.’”). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).  
 197. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (citation omitted) (quoting Silverman, 
365 U.S. at 512).   
 198. Id. at 40 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980)). 
 199. See supra Part I. 
 200. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34. 
 201. Duarte, supra note 14, at 1154 (“In many places, smart meter adoption is all but 
compulsory. Utility companies typically inform the consumer that a smart meter will be installed 
and then send an employee to install the meter.”).  
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nature of smart meter installation brings this issue somewhat away from 
Kyllo, it drops it squarely into the bounds of Carpenter. 
For many in the United States, smart meters are installed as part of 
mandatory utility upgrades.202 Though some states require that utilities 
allow customers to “opt out” of smart meter installation, the utilities can 
and do charge one-time fees or monthly fees that can be prohibitively 
expensive.203 Some utilities, such as Commonwealth Edison (ComEd), 
which serves the greater Chicago area, do not allow for permanent opt 
outs and only permits consumers to pay to delay the installation of the 
smart meter.204 Moreover, when consumers move residences or purchase 
new homes, it is unlikely that they will reach out to the utility to have an 
already-installed smart meter removed, and many utilities would charge 
consumers to have the meters switched out.205 Further, consumers are 
often unable to switch their electricity provider due to the regional 
monopoly structure of public utilities in much of the United States.206 
Many electricity customers are “captive customers” and must use the 
public utility in their geographic area or go without electricity, which is 
not really an option in the twenty-first century.207  
Carpenter does not lay out a clear test for when to look beyond the 
third-party doctrine and grant Fourth Amendment protection to an 
individual’s personal data. Orin Kerr, the year after Carpenter, 
understood it as proposing a three-step test.208 First, the business records 
in question must be new to the “digital age.”209 Second, the records must 
 
 202. See id. at 1153–54.  
 203. Smart Meter Opt-Out Options and Fees, ELECTRONIC SILENT SPRING, 
http://www.electronicsilentspring.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/SMART-METER-OPT-
OUT-OPTIONS-AND-FEES-by-STATE.pdf [https://perma.cc/AU2A-5AZY] (last updated Nov. 
6, 2016) (explaining, for example, in California, Sacramento consumers must pay a one-time fee 
of $127 in addition to $14 per month to have their analog meter read by the utility company).  
 204. See id. 
 205. See W. MONROE PARTNERS, AMI OPT-OUT: POLICIES, PROGRAMS AND IMPACTS ON 
BUSINESS CASES (2015), https://www.westmonroepartners.com/-/media/Files/White-Papers/ 
West-Monroe-Partners-AMI-Opt-Out-White-Paper-62012.pdf [https://perma.cc/8H4G-6ZNW] 
(demonstrating that there are many different ways that utilities provide for customers to opt out 
including charging customers a monthly fee for continued use of their analog meter); Smart Meter 
Opt-Out Options and Fees, supra note 203 (illustrating that several utilities, including Duke 
Energy Ohio, charge money for replacing the smart meter with an analog meter and then also 
charge for monthly analog meter readings). 
 206. See David Roberts, Power Utilities Are Built for the 20th Century. That’s Why They’re 
Flailing in the 21st., VOX (Sept. 9, 2015, 9:10 AM), https://www.vox.com/2015/9/9/9287719/ 
utilities-monopoly [https://perma.cc/9JKB-SNP5]. 
 207. See id. 
 208. Orin S. Kerr, Implementing Carpenter (USC Law Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 
18-29, 2018) (manuscript at 3), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3301257 [https://perma.cc/2VKD-
A2E9]. 
 209. See id. 
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be created without “meaningful voluntary choice.”210 And, third, “the 
records must tend to reveal ‘the privacies of life.’”211 Steps two and three 
of Kerr’s framework appear to be inherent in the language of Carpenter; 
Chief Justice Roberts spent a great deal of time discussing voluntariness 
and exposure risk.212 And, on these steps, smart meters would likely 
trigger Fourth Amendment protection. If going without a cell phone is 
not considered a viable way of avoiding the collection of cell phone 
location data, then going without power is not a viable way of avoiding 
the collection of smart meter data.213 Similarly, if smart meter data can 
show at least “when you are at home and when you are away, when you 
lie down and when you rise,”214 that likely qualifies as the “privacies of 
life.” 
The first requirement—that the records be new to the digital age or 
substantially transformed by it—is less clear. Kerr explains this step as 
requiring that “[t]he records must be of a kind and nature that generally 
could not be collected in a pre-digital age. Pre-digital records and their 
modern equivalents are exempt, sort of like a constitutional grandfather 
clause.”215 He points to language from Chief Justice Roberts’s majority 
opinion referring to “seismic shifts in digital technology that [have] made 
possible”216 access to “an entirely different species”217 of data that “do[] 
not fit neatly under existing precedents.”218 
We fear that one can plausibly argue that almost all types of records 
have been substantially transformed by the digital age, making this prong 
of the test somewhat useless. Have bank statements been substantially 
transformed by the digital age? Arguably, yes. Credit cards as we now 
understand them were only introduced in the 1950s.219 Electronic 
processing of credit card payments only began in the 1970s.220 It was only 
in 1986 that Visa launched an ad campaign trumpeting its evolution 
“from a travel and business tool to a card for everyday use.”221 In 1970, 
only 16% of families had a bank-type credit card, such as Visa or 
 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. (manuscript at 22). 
 212. Id. (manuscript at 20–21). 
 213. See supra notes 151–152 and accompanying text.  
 214. Deuteronomy 6:7 (New Revised Standard Version). 
 215. Kerr, supra note 208 (manuscript at 16). 
 216. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018). 
 217. Id. at 2222. 
 218. Id. at 2214. 
 219. See History of Credit Card Processing, BEBUSINESSED.COM, https://bebusinessed.com/ 
history/history-of-credit-card-processing/ [https://perma.cc/N4SS-WSM6].  
 220. Id.; see Claire Tsosie, What the First Credit Cards Were Like, FORBES (Aug. 29, 2016, 
12:27 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/clairetsosie/2016/08/29/what-the-first-credit-cards-
were-like/#2f051835ec9a [https://perma.cc/LA4Y-WGFN]. 
 221. History of Visa: Our Journey, VISA, https://usa.visa.com/about-visa/our_business/ 
history-of-visa.html [https://perma.cc/9QDC-PJZR]. 
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Mastercard.222 By 1998, 68% of families had such a card.223 Nationwide, 
a 2017 survey suggested that only a quarter of in-store purchases are now 
completed using cash—online purchases are, of course, virtually never 
conducted with cash.224 Many law students at Northwestern University 
say that they do not even carry cash on a regular basis. This means that 
every transaction conducted by these students is directly reflected in the 
records of a financial institution. A bank knows when and where they got 
their morning coffee, how often they buy lunch rather than pack it, and 
which friend they Venmo for their share of the bar tab after class. Miller, 
which found no expectation of privacy in bank records, was decided in 
1976.225 The world of bank records has substantially changed in the 
intervening years.  
Bank statements are only one example of how easy it is to argue that 
“old” data is now “new” data. Kerr himself makes a similar point about 
the metadata of Facebook messages and texts, arguing that Carpenter 
requires protection for them despite the clear holding of Smith for 
telephone metadata.226 We agree that the Carpenter exception should 
apply in this context, but this portion of Kerr’s (and Chief Justice 
Roberts’s) test is either so easily satisfied, or so arbitrarily judged, that it 
is rarely going to be useful. Nevertheless, smart meters are products of 
the digital revolution; they have only been in widespread use for about a 
decade.227 And smart meters convey far more information than did the 
old analog meters. If one assumes an analog meter is read once a month, 
then a digital meter being read every fifteen minutes conveys 
approximately 2,880 times as much information.228 If anything is new to 
the digital age and transformed by it, these records are. 
As with cell-site location data, the collection of smart meter data from 
private utilities also likely implicates the Fourth Amendment. The 
 
 222. See Thomas A. Durkin, Credit Cards: Use and Consumer Attitudes, 1970–2000, FED. 
RES. BULL., Sept. 2000, at 623, 625 n.3, 625 fig.1. Technically the names Visa and Mastercard 
came later, but the brand predecessors were active in 1970. See, e.g., Jeremy M. Simon, Visa: A 
Short History, CREDITCARDS.COM (Mar. 30, 2007), https://www.creditcards.com/ credit-card-
news/history-of-visa-1273.php [https://perma.cc/B88L-2SXL]. 
 223. Durkin, supra note 222. 
 224. TSYS, 2017 U.S. CONSUMER PAYMENT STUDY 40 (2018). One could conduct online 
purchases via cash, check, or money order were one to send payment via mail. This would require 
the purchaser to be able to find a stamp, however, and this is well-known to be impossible. 
 225. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440–42 (1976). 
 226. Kerr, supra note 208 (manuscript at 43–45) (arguing that “[f]or today’s teenagers, 
texting is like speaking” due to the sheer number of texts sent in a day). 
 227. See T. Wang, Number of Electric Smart Meters Installations Deployed in the U.S. from 
2007 to 2020 (in million units), STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/676472/number-of-
smart-meter-installations-in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/8NWV-2S5P] (showing that 
approximately 7 million smart meters had been installed in the United States by the end of 2007 
and that 72 million had been installed by the end of 2016). 
 228. With four readings per hour in a thirty-day month, there are 2,880 readings per month. 
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Supreme Court should follow its reasoning in Kyllo and Carpenter when 
considering how to protect smart meter data and should reject the 
application of the third-party doctrine to it. Ultimately, the risk posed by 
technological advancements and the interconnection of smart meters to 
the internet of devices within the home is too high and therefore smart 
meter data should be provided additional protections.  
D.  Reasonableness Balancing and Public Utilities 
All Carpenter and Kyllo establish, however, is that the Fourth 
Amendment is implicated—that collection of smart meter data is a 
search—even if that data is in the hands of a third-party corporation and 
not held by the consumer. This still leaves two further questions. First, is 
the collection of smart meter data an “unreasonable” search? Recall that 
reasonableness enters the Fourth Amendment analysis twice, once in 
deciding whether something is a search—reasonable expectations of 
privacy—and then in evaluating whether that search is permissible 
without a warrant.229 Second, what about when the government is the 
utility? Many utilities in the United States are government owned or 
operated.230 Is it a Fourth Amendment problem to mandate the collection 
of smart meter data? 
In Carpenter, the Supreme Court rapidly stepped from the conclusion 
that the Fourth Amendment was implicated—that the collection of 
several days of historical cell-site data was a search—to the conclusion 
that only a warrant based upon probable cause could justify the transfer 
of that information to the government for use in a criminal investigation. 
“Although the ‘ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a 
governmental search is “reasonableness,”’ our cases establish that 
warrantless searches are typically unreasonable where ‘a search is 
undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of criminal 
wrongdoing.’”231 The Carpenter Court has been criticized for the speed 
of this jump. For instance, Alan Rozenshtein commented that the Court 
reached this conclusion “[w]ithout much analysis.”232 He would have 
preferred a contextual reasonableness analysis for the protection of 
Carpenter-style third-party data, with substantial deference to legislative 
judgements, rather than a flat warrant rule.233 
We see no reason to quarrel with the traditional warrant rule in either 
the smart meter or cell site data contexts; Carpenter is on firm doctrinal 
 
 229. See supra notes 121–125 and accompanying text.  
 230. See supra notes 118–120 and accompanying text. 
 231. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018) (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 
47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652–53 (1995)). 
 232. Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Fourth Amendment Reasonableness After Carpenter, 128 YALE 
L.J.F. 943, 946 (2019). 
 233. See id. at 954–60. 
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ground in making the leap from the implication of the Fourth Amendment 
to a warrant requirement when the purpose of the data collection is law 
enforcement use.234 So this settles the case of the government requesting 
energy-consumption data from a private utility for law enforcement 
purposes. But this reasonableness question is more complicated when 
considering government utilities. Is it a search for a government, such as 
a publicly owned utility, to install a smart meter and, if so, is the search 
of the energy-usage data reasonable? Or, put another way, what kinds of 
protections are required to make such a search reasonable? 
Consideration of the Fourth Amendment implications of public utility 
smart meter installation goes beyond the criminal law aspects of the 
Fourth Amendment. In general, the criminal/noncriminal distinction is 
exceptionally important in the context of the Fourth Amendment. When 
the government acts as an employer, for instance, it will often have an 
understandable need to gather information about current and prospective 
employees. Though this information collection would often require a 
warrant based upon probable cause in the law enforcement context, 
reasonable suspicion is often sufficient in the employment domain.  
In contrast . . . public employers are not enforcers of the 
criminal law; instead, public employers have a direct and 
overriding interest in ensuring that the work of the agency is 
conducted in a proper and efficient manner. In our view, 
therefore, a probable cause requirement for searches of the 
type at issue here would impose intolerable burdens on 
public employers.235  
Similarly, the warrant requirement often does not apply in the public-
education context because, again, school officials are not generally 
enforcers of criminal law.236 
Based on these precedents, the government may be able to collect 
smart meter data for utility purposes even if it would require a warrant to 
do so for law enforcement purposes. The reasonableness balancing that 
so quickly leads to a warrant requirement in the law enforcement domain 
will function differently outside of it. To explore this non-law 
enforcement balancing, it is helpful to consider the constitutional right to 
information privacy more generally. This right, though based in part in 
the Fourth Amendment, stems from the traditions of Griswold v. 
Connecticut237 and Roe v. Wade238 rather than the enforcement of 
 
 234. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 652–53. 
 235. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 724 (1987). 
 236. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (holding that “school officials need 
not obtain a warrant before searching a student who is under their authority”). 
 237. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 238. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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criminal law. One case in the information-privacy domain presents a 
close analogy for smart meters. In Whalen v. Roe,239 the Court evaluated 
the constitutionality of a New York act requiring reporting and storage of 
information concerning all Schedule II drug prescriptions.240 Physicians 
were required to report the name of “the prescribing physician; the 
dispensing pharmacy; the drug and dosage; and the name, address, and 
age of the patient.”241 The district court had struck down the act as an 
unnecessary intrusion into one of the “zones of privacy accorded 
constitutional protection.”242 
The Supreme Court overturned the district court.243 Those challenging 
the law had argued that doctors would be less willing to prescribe, and 
patients would be less willing to use, certain drugs given these 
regulations.244 The Court, however, held that patients’ privacy interests 
were not grievously impacted because the law’s data-security provisions 
were sufficient to prevent accidental disclosure or inappropriate use of 
the information.245 The collection of the information was reasonable 
given its value to the public in preventing abuse of prescription drugs and 
the safeguards the government imposed to prevent public release of the 
data. The limited public-safety purpose, independent of criminal law 
enforcement, made constitutionally permissible what was otherwise a 
severe intrusion into a sensitive domain. 
Since the Supreme Court upheld New York’s information-gathering 
statute, it is unclear how intrusive a practice must be to violate the right 
to information privacy, or even whether there is such a freestanding right. 
Lower courts are split. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
subsequently developed a seven-part test to determine whether the 
government could acquire records like those at issue in Whalen.246 This 
test, broadly speaking, balances the magnitude of the privacy invasion 
(including the harm likely to be inflicted if the data is subsequently 
released and the extent of the data-security measures) against the extent 
of the state’s interest.247 The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fifth, 
 
 239. 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
 240. See id. at 591, 593. 
 241. See id. at 593. 
 242. Id. at 596. 
 243. Id. at 603–04. 
 244. Id. at 600. 
 245. See id. at 600–02. 
 246. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980). 
 247. See id. The factors are: (1) the “type of record requested,” (2) “the information it does 
or might contain,” (3) “the potential for harm in any subsequent nonconsensual disclosure,” (4) 
the injury a disclosure would cause to the relationship that generated the record, (5) the “adequacy 
of safeguards to prevent disclosure,” (6) “the degree of need for access,” and (7) whether there is 
a public policy reason or statutory mandate militating toward access. Id.; see also Doe v. Se. Pa. 
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Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have all also recognized the right in some 
form,248 but the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has been 
more cautious and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit has questioned whether there is a constitutional right to 
information privacy at all.249  
The Supreme Court’s only other major return to the constitutional 
right to information privacy sheds further light on how to think of the 
“government as utility” question. In NASA v. Nelson,250 the Supreme 
Court considered the constitutionality of the government asking intrusive 
questions in its background checks in its capacity as an employer.251 The 
expanded background check at issue in Nelson was moderately invasive, 
inviting commentary on a potential contractor’s medical status, criminal 
history, financial stability, and interpersonal relationships.252 Private 
employers often inquire into a broad range of deeply personal topics as 
part of their hiring processes, so this was not out of step with industry 
practices.253  
The Court held that these inquiries were constitutionally 
permissible.254 It emphasized that the government has a “much freer 
hand” when acting in its capacity as an employer than it does when it 
“brings its sovereign power to bear on citizens at large.”255 It could make 
the same sorts of inquiries that a private employer would, and these 
questions were very common in the private sector.256 The open-ended 
 
Transp. Auth., 72 F.3d 1133, 1135–38 (3d Cir. 1995) (applying this test to the disclosure of an 
employee’s HIV status). 
 248. See, e.g., Coffman v. Indianapolis Fire Dep’t, 578 F.3d 559, 566 (7th Cir. 2009); In re 
Crawford, 194 F.3d 954, 959 (9th Cir. 1999); Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1559 
(2d Cir. 1983); Fadjo v. Coon, 633 F.2d 1172, 1176 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 249. See J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1089–90 (6th Cir. 1981) (“We do not view the 
discussion of confidentiality in Whalen v. Roe as . . . creating a constitutional right to have all 
government action weighed against the resulting breach of confidentiality.”); Am. Fed’n of Gov’t 
Emps. v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 118 F.3d 786, 791 (D.C. Cir 1997). 
 250. 562 U.S. 134 (2011). 
 251. Id. at 138. 
 252. See id. at 140–42. The applicants themselves were asked standard biographical and 
work-history information as well as whether they had used, supplied, or manufactured illegal 
drugs in the preceding year. Id. at 141. The applicants’ references, however, were asked an 
extensive range of open-ended questions. Id. at 141–42. One question asked whether the reference 
had “any reason to question” the employee’s “honesty or trustworthiness” and another whether 
the reference knew of any “adverse information” concerning the employee’s “‘violation of the 
law,’ ‘financial integrity,’ ‘abuse of alcohol and/or drugs,’ ‘mental or emotional stability,’ 
‘general behavior or conduct,’ or ‘other matters.’” Id. at 141–42. 
 253. See Stephen F. Befort, Pre-Employment Screening and Investigation: Navigating 
Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 365, 381–400 (1997) (describing the 
types of information that employers can and do collect). 
 254. Nelson, 562 U.S. at 151–52. 
 255. Id. at 148 (quoting Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 598 (2008)). 
 256. See id. at 155. 
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questions, then, were justifiable as a reasonable measure “aimed at 
identifying capable employees who [would] faithfully conduct the 
Government’s business” and for separating strong and weak 
candidates.257  
Taking Nelson seriously suggests that the government, as a utility, 
should be allowed to collect all the same kinds of information that a 
private utility would. The government, wearing its utility hat, has valid 
need of that information and it is not unreasonable for the government to 
collect information regularly collected by private parties. But taking 
Whalen seriously means that the government incurs special obligations 
when it uses its “utility hat” to justify the collection of personal 
information. It must constantly seek to balance its legitimate need for the 
information—both its need as an actor in the national marketplace and its 
need as a promoter of the public good—with the privacy concerns of 
those whose data it is collecting. And the government must be conscious 
of a key difference from Nelson. In that case, people were freely choosing 
to enter an employment relationship with the government and therefore 
give to the government all the information that they would normally give 
to an employer. People are often not freely choosing to have smart meters 
installed. 
Only one federal court of appeals—the Seventh Circuit—has wrestled 
with the issue of smart meters in the post-Carpenter world, and its 
treatment of reasonableness and government hat wearing is instructive. 
In Naperville Smart Meter v. City of Naperville,258 a nonprofit 
organization opposed the city’s replacement of the old analog meters with 
new smart meters, alleging that the city’s collection of the smart meter 
data constituted an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.259 
Since the smart meter initiative was being implemented by a municipal 
utility, the mere installation of the meters raised Fourth Amendment 
concerns; the government would receive the energy-consumption reports 
directly rather than from a third-party utility.260 Naperville’s smart meters 
collect residents’ energy-consumption data every fifteen minutes, the 
information is stored for up to three years, and residents are unable to opt 
out of the smart meter program; participation is mandatory.261  
Considering the voluntariness and exposure prongs of Carpenter, the 
court readily concluded that smart meter data—specifically smart meter 
 
 257. See id. at 154. 
 258. 900 F.3d 521 (7th Cir. 2018). 
 259. Id. at 524. 
 260. Id. at 527. 
 261. See id. at 524. 
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installation—implicated the Fourth Amendment.262 As the Seventh 
Circuit recognized, “[I]n this context, a choice to share data imposed by 
fiat is no choice at all. . . . [A] home occupant does not assume the risk of 
near constant monitoring by choosing to have electricity in her home.”263 
The disclosure of information was therefore neither voluntary nor the 
result of any affirmative act by the person being surveilled. The Seventh 
Circuit further noted that smart meters have been adopted “only by a 
portion of a highly specialized industry,” which under Kyllo, would make 
them not in “general public use.”264 This seems somewhat absurd—the 
highly specialized industry in question being one that is almost 
universally used. But the court may have been using this analysis to 
buttress its shift from Carpenter’s focus on third-party business records 
to Kyllo’s focus on collection using new technology. 
Having easily and, in our view, correctly concluded that the collection 
of smart meter data by a public utility is a search, the court then assessed 
whether the search was reasonable.265 To start, the Seventh Circuit 
properly considered the benefits that smart meters bring to the city of 
Naperville.266 The court noted that “[s]mart meters allow utilities to 
reduce costs, provide cheaper power to consumers, encourage energy 
efficiency, and increase grid stability. . . . [T]hese interests render the 
city’s search reasonable, where the search is unrelated to law 
enforcement . . . and presents little risk of corollary criminal 
consequences.”267 The court’s analysis included consideration of who 
was collecting the data and for what purpose, and it balanced the interests 
of those involved.268 The court noted that “Naperville’s amended ‘Smart 
Grid Customer Bill of Rights’ clarifies that the city’s public utility will 
not provide customer data to third parties, including law enforcement, 
without a warrant or court order.”269 It was persuaded by the benefits 
provided by smart meters and the additional protections afforded the 
customer data.270 Notably, the court warned that its holding was limited 
 
 262. Id. at 525, 527 (“Their data, even when collected at fifteen-minute intervals, reveals 
details about the home that would be otherwise unavailable to government officials with a 
physical search. Naperville therefore ‘searches’ its residents’ homes when it collects this data.”).  
 263. Id. at 527. 
 264. Id.  
 265. Id. at 528–29. 
 266. Id. at 529. 
 267. Id.  
 268. Id. at 528–29. 
 269. Id. at 528. 
 270. Id. at 528–29 (“Since these searches are not performed as part of a criminal 
investigation we can turn immediately to an assessment of whether they are reasonable, ‘by 
balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of 
legitimate government interests.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 
542 U.S. 177, 187–88 (2004))).  
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to the particular circumstances of Naperville and that if the data was 
collected in shorter intervals (more frequently than once every fifteen 
minutes) or if it was “more easily accessible to law enforcement or other 
city officials,” then its conclusion would likely change.271 The Seventh 
Circuit oddly did not engage with Whalen or Nelson, two cases that would 
have naturally supported its conclusions. 
Part I’s ode to smart meters should have persuaded you that, on 
balance, the town of Naperville is better off for having them installed. 
But Naperville highlights a fundamental tension in smart meter privacy. 
There are huge public benefits to having smart meters as a tool for grid 
management. Utilities need this information for a host of extremely 
important purposes, and most of the initiatives that utilities want to use 
the data for will only help consumers. Few would object to their utility 
being promptly informed that their house is now without power due to a 
storm, for instance. But there are many other potential uses for this data. 
What about energy-efficiency studies? Public-awareness campaigns? 
Identifiable data provided to researchers, or even private for-profit 
vendors of smart energy solutions? Even if you agree that a warrant 
should be required for law enforcement access to smart meter data, that 
still leaves unresolved any number of privacy questions. 
This Part showed that obtaining smart meter data from a private utility 
for law enforcement purposes implicates the Fourth Amendment and 
should require a warrant. It also showed that a public utility installing a 
smart meter for non-law enforcement purposes, and therefore collecting 
the data directly, also implicates the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth 
Amendment analysis required by Nelson and Whalen makes clear that 
non-law enforcement government information gathering will be 
subjected to a nuanced reasonableness analysis. This requires the kind of 
detail work that is hard to manage working solely from constitutional first 
principles. And there is a real danger here of ending up with low 
constitutional protection against government information collection if 
there is no statutory protection against private information collection, 
which can be seen in how the Court’s analysis in Nelson turned on the 
practices of private employers. This is an area that could therefore benefit 
greatly from legislative action to set minimum privacy standards for both 
 
 271. Id. at 529. The Seventh Circuit’s concern with duration and the party collecting the data 
are similar to concerns raised by both Justice Sonia Sotomayor and Justice Samuel Alito. See 
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“The net result is 
that GPS monitoring—by making available at a relatively low cost such a substantial quantum of 
intimate information about any person whom the government, in its unfettered discretion, chooses 
to track—may ‘alter the relationship between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to 
democratic society.’” (quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(Flaum, J., concurring), vacated, 565 U.S. 1189 (2012))); id. at 429 (Alito, J., concurring) 
(“Devices like the one used in the present case, however, make long-term monitoring relatively 
easy and cheap.”).  
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governmental and private information collection. Part III therefore moves 
away from the constitutional analysis and considers legislative solutions 
to energy privacy. It examines both the solutions already enacted in 
several states as well as some proposed federal legislation. Ultimately, 
we set out a model for how energy privacy should be regulated. 
III.  PROPOSED SOLUTION TO PROTECTING ENERGY DATA 
The data collected by smart meters, including information from 
interconnected devices, provides utilities with insight into when and how 
energy is being used in short increments of time. As discussed in Part I, 
that information can be used to increase the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the current grid and transform it into a smart grid. Better managing 
how and when energy is produced and used will be key to reducing both 
carbon emissions and costs.272 Thus, the information supplied by smart 
meters can and should be used by utilities to achieve these goals.  
Since this information should be collectable, the question then 
becomes what rules and regulations must be applied to that collection. 
Here, state and federal legislative action may prove superior to relying on 
courts. The legislative process is much better suited for the kind of 
detailed factfinding required to create a unified regulatory scheme. And 
federal regulation may be particularly helpful in that it would avoid 
problems of uneven and haphazard local action.273 Courts, by contrast, 
are bound by the facts of the cases presented to them and are often unable 
or unwilling to provide guidance beyond those facts. Carpenter, for 
instance, raised questions about dozens of issues and it may be years 
before courts give clear answers to any of them.274 
Further, Fourth Amendment litigation concerns only government 
action—it does not apply to private companies.275 One can therefore 
regulate all law enforcement use of smart meter data via the Fourth 
Amendment but not all commercial use of it. This could lead to awkward 
results, with those who happened to live in municipalities with public 
utilities enjoying privacy protection while those in municipalities with 
private utilities being left entirely at the mercy of data brokers. As 
mentioned in Part II, it could also ultimately undermine constitutional 
privacy protection if energy-usage data is not also protected in the private 
sphere; courts might be reluctant to impose a warrant requirement for data 
that can be freely obtained on the open market. A legislative body, 
 
 272. Horne et al., supra note 51, at 65. 
 273. See Forbush, supra note 109, at 375 (“The very real possibility of ratepayer energy 
consumption data being unevenly regulated by state legislatures and public service commissions 
demonstrates the need for a baseline privacy standard set at the national level.”). 
 274. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018).  
 275. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349–50 (1974).  
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however, can always impose additional safeguards beyond those required 
by the Constitution and can regulate both private and public entities. 
The United States currently does not have a single comprehensive 
federal law regulating the collection and use of personal data.276 Instead 
it has a “patchwork system of federal and state laws . . . that can 
sometimes overlap, dovetail and contradict one another.”277 At the federal 
level, for example, banking privacy is regulated by the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act,278 educational privacy by the Family Educational Rights and 
Privacy Act,279 and health privacy by the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act.280 Sometimes these focused privacy regulations are 
powerful. The Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act,281 for 
example, has enabled a wave of lawsuits.282 Yet other times they are 
comparatively toothless. All three of those federal statutes lack a private 
right of action.283  
Due to the depth and breadth of data now collected by electric, gas, 
and water smart meters, it is time that this domain too receive its own 
targeted federal regulatory scheme. The question is how best to structure 
that regime. As will be seen below, we borrow aspects from many other 
privacy laws. Overall, the regime seeks to empower the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) to regulate the collection of smart meter data, giving 
it the kind of enforcement authority that it enjoys under the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act284 and requiring it to issue the kinds of guidelines that it 
 
 276. Reforming the U.S. Approach to Data Protection and Privacy, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
REL. (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/report/reforming-us-approach-data-protection [https:// 
perma.cc/DJY3-JGSA]. 
 277. Ieuan Jolly, Data Protection in the United States: Overview, WESTLAW (2018), https:// 
1.next.westlaw.com/6-502-0467?transitionType=Default&contextData=%28sc.Default %29.  
 278. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 6803 
(2018)). 
 279. Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 571 (1974) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1232g). 
 280. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 26 U.S.C.). 
 281. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/1 (2008).  
 282. Matthew B. Kugler, From Identification to Identity Theft: Public Perceptions of 
Biometric Privacy Harms, U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 107, 108–09, 113 (2019). 
 283. George C. Hlavac & Edward J. Easterly, FERPA Primer: The Basics and Beyond, 
NAT’L ASS’N OF COLLEGES & EMPLOYERS (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.naceweb.org/public-policy 
-and-legal/legal-issues/ferpa-primer-the-basics-and-beyond/ [https://perma.cc/F7PW-X6HY] 
(“Courts have routinely held that FERPA does not create a private right of action against the 
educational institution.”); Can a Patient Sue for a HIPAA Violation?, HIPAA J. (Nov. 7, 2017), 
https://www.hipaajournal.com/sue-for-hipaa-violation/ [https://perma.cc/XP88-MNSW]; The 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR., https://epic.org/privacy/glba/ 
[https://perma.cc/8AX7-6JFM] (“Enforcement rests solely with federal government agencies, 
leaving the individual no private right of action.”). 
 284. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114, 1128 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1681–1681x). 
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did under the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998.285 Due 
to the FTC’s current charge to protect consumer data, expanding its 
responsibility and enforcement power into the area of smart meter data 
would be the most effective solution at this time.  
This Part outlines the major features of that proposed legislation—the 
Energy Use Privacy Act (EUPA). This Act would explicitly empower the 
FTC to regulate the use of smart meter data within set guidelines, 
including addressing when government actors should be able to access 
smart meter data and when and how it should be shared with private 
companies. In creating this new regulatory regime, this Article draws 
inspiration from current statutes in other sectors and proposed statutes 
that have not yet passed.286 Further, several states have already started 
legislating in this area and provide excellent models for the kind of data 
regime that is vital to protecting consumer privacy.287 Ultimately, a 
uniform and consistent regulatory framework for smart meter data and 
the devices that connect to the meters could enable the United States to 
achieve smart grid development while also protecting private consumer 
information.  
Before detailing this proposed legislation, it is worth reviewing both 
a previous federal proposal for energy privacy as well as the FTC’s more 
general role in the privacy space. Though there is no current 
comprehensive federal legislation protecting energy privacy, the 
proposed federal Electric Consumer Right to Know Act,288 sponsored by 
then-Senators Mark Udall (D-Colo.) and Scott Brown (R-Mass.), would 
have provided some protection. It stated that “consumers should have the 
right to control the electric energy usage information of the consumers 
and the right to privacy for the information when third party aggregators 
of data are involved in creation, management, or collection of the 
information.”289 The proposed Act also stated that “consumers should 
 
 285. Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-728 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 6501). 
Congress has repeatedly outsourced such regulations to the FTC. See, e.g., id. 
 286. For example, “the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB) obligates financial institutions to 
respect the privacy of customers and protect the security and confidentiality of those customers’ 
‘nonpublic personal information’ by monitoring their sharing of customer information with third 
parties.” Forbush, supra note 109, at 354 (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809). The Fair Credit 
Reporting Act requires institutions to prevent the disclosure of private information and issues 
fines if its requirements are violated. FED. TRADE COMM’N, 40 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE WITH THE 
FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT: AN FTC STAFF REPORT WITH SUMMARY OF INTERPRETATIONS 60, 
89–90 (2011). 
 287. Cassarah Brown, States Get Smart: Encouraging and Regulating Smart Grid 
Technologies, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (July 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/ 
regulating-and-encouraging-smart-grid-technologies.aspx [https://perma.cc/3A5K-6LYP]. 
 288. S. 1029, 112th Cong. (2011).  
 289. Id. § 2(7). 
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retain the right to the privacy and security of electric energy usage 
information of the consumers created through usage.”290  
The limitation of this proposed Act is that it was more focused on 
providing consumers with the right to understand and access their 
electric-usage information and less on protecting that information from 
other parties. Though empowering consumers through disclosure is a 
helpful starting point—and certainly preferable to not providing 
information to consumers—far more protection is necessary. As an 
increasingly large body of literature shows, there is great reason to be 
skeptical of any approach to privacy that relies heavily on people actively 
seeking out information and making informed choices.291 Most people do 
not want to read long privacy policies or actively manage their privacy in 
the consumer sphere. Also, disclosure will only accomplish so much, 
especially when, as here, people have limited ability to change utility 
service providers. 
The desire to move beyond disclosure leads to a focus on set rules. As 
an initial step in establishing these rules, it is essential to identify a single 
agency to oversee the responsible sharing of smart meter data. Smart 
meters are likely to interface with a variety of optional consumer smart 
home products. Were these interfacing products regulated by the FTC 
(which has evolved into the de facto federal protector of consumer 
privacy292) while the meters themselves were regulated by, say, the 
Department of Energy, policy could easily grow incoherent. Therefore, 
localizing the responsibility to govern information sharing in a single 
entity is preferred. This distinguishes between the immediate use of smart 
meter data for smart grid management, which should be operated by local 
utilities, and the use of the data for other purposes, which should be 
subject to FTC oversight.  
Currently, the FTC is the agency most directly involved in the privacy 
regulation of smart home devices. Under Section 5 of the FTC Act,293 the 
 
 290. Id. § 2(6). 
 291. See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Even More Than You Wanted to Know About the 
Failures of Disclosure, 11 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 63, 71–72 (2015); Florencia Marotta-
Wurgler, Self-Regulation and Competition in Privacy Policies, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. S13, S16 (2016) 
(showing that privacy policies claiming compliance with privacy certifications are often not 
actually in compliance); Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Privacy Harms and the Effectiveness of the 
Notice and Choice Framework, 11 I/S 485, 487 (2015); Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy 
Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1885 (2013); Jedidiah 
Bracy, Are Notice and Consent Possible with the Internet of Things?, IAPP (Nov. 20, 2013), 
https://iapp.org/news/a/is-notice-and-consent-possible-with-the-internet-of-things/ [https://perma 
.cc/Q2LD-C6XC]. For a limited defense of notice and choice, see M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice 
Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027, 1047–50 (2012). 
 292. See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of 
Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 600–06 (2014).  
 293. Act of Mar. 21, 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-447, 52 Stat. 111, 111 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2018)).  
49
Kugler and Hurley: Protecting Energy Privacy Across the Public/Private Divide
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
500 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72 
 
FTC is charged with preventing companies from engaging in “unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”294 This has been 
the main source of its regulatory authority for enforcing privacy policies 
and preventing egregious misuses of consumer data.295 This enforcement, 
however, largely takes the form of requiring companies to not lie in their 
privacy policies,296 and companies may be able to avoid FTC 
enforcement merely by not making promises about how they will manage 
private data.297 Moreover, the FTC’s emphasis on regulating companies 
through their privacy policies is limited in light of “[s]ocial science 
research reveal[ing] that consumers do not read or understand privacy 
policies, are heavily influenced by the way choices are framed, and 
harbor many preexisting assumptions that are incorrect.”298 In this way, 
the FTC’s policies in the smart home-device arena reflect the same 
problems with notice and choice that were just reviewed.299 
The FTC’s approach to privacy regulation has been criticized on other 
grounds as well. It has been called overly cautious for failing to 
meaningfully punish large companies such as Google and Apple when 
they overstep.300 Prior to June 2019, the FTC’s largest privacy fine was 
in 2012 for $22.5 million.301 The subject of the fine, Google, earned $46 
billion in revenue that year.302 And, notably, the FTC could only issue 
that fine because Google violated a preexisting consent decree—the FTC 
does not have direct fining authority under Section 5 and must wait for a 
bad actor to recidivate in violation of an existing judgment to issue a 
 
 294. Id.  
 295. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 292, at 600–06. 
 296. See id. at 628–31. 
 297. See Privacy and Security Enforcement, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/ 
news-events/media-resources/protecting-consumer-privacy/privacy-security-enforcement 
[https://perma.cc/B7X6-WJUW] (laying out FTC enforcement policies). See also Public 
Statement, Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Joshua D. Wright Regarding the Matter of 
Nomi Technologies, Inc. (Apr. 23, 2015) (expressing concern that the overzealous enforcement 
of privacy policies might deter transparency). 
 298. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 292, at 667. 
 299. FED. TRADE COMM’N, INTERNET OF THINGS: PRIVACY & SECURITY IN A CONNECTED 
WORLD 21–22 (2015).  
 300. Nicholas Confessore & Cecilia Kang, Facebook Data Scandals Stoke Criticism That a 
Privacy Watchdog Too Rarely Bites, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/12/30/technology/facebook-data-privacy-ftc.html [https://perma.cc/58HX-VET7] (“In 
more than 40 interviews, former and current F.T.C. officials, lawmakers, Capitol Hill staff 
members, and consumer advocates said that as evidence of abuses has piled up against tech 
companies, the F.T.C. has been too cautious.”).  
 301. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Google Will Pay $22.5 Million to Settle FTC 
Charges it Misrepresented Privacy Assurances to Users of Apple’s Safari Internet Browser (Aug. 
9, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/08/google-will-pay-225-million-
settle-ftc-charges-it-misrepresented [https://perma.cc/7YPZ-8WHE]. 
 302. Alphabet Revenue 2006–2019, MACROTRENDS, https://www.macrotrends.net/stocks/ 
charts/GOOG/alphabet/revenue [https://perma.cc/Z8G4-LCJX]. 
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monetary penalty.303 Moreover, the FTC has not filed that many privacy 
complaints. In fact, it only brought 170 between 1997 and 2014.304 The 
recent $5 billion fine against Facebook, which covers years of privacy 
violations, is exceptional.305 And even the effectiveness of that fine is 
disputed, as two of the five FTC Commissioners filed dissenting 
statements calling it inadequate.306 
In one representative smart home device case, the FTC filed a 
complaint against TRENDnet for security flaws in its home security 
cameras.307 These cameras were supposed to have both public and private 
modes.308 The public mode was supposed to be visible to anyone with an 
appropriate link.309 The private mode was supposed to be visible only to 
people with the correct login credentials.310 Due to a software flaw, even 
private feeds were publicly viewable and camera IP information even 
revealed the approximate locations of the video feeds.311 The FTC alleged 
that TRENDnet’s claims of security constituted false or misleading 
representations because it “failed to provide reasonable security to 
prevent unauthorized access to the live feeds from its IP cameras.”312 In 
short, TRENDnet had promised private feeds and not delivered them. The 
FTC required TRENDnet to establish a comprehensive security program 
and provide additional technical and physical safeguards to prevent such 
a thing from happening again.313 Notably, it did not fine TRENDnet.314 It 
settled a similar case against D-Link on similar terms in July 2019.315  
As shown in TRENDnet, this enforcement is very focused on two 
kinds of privacy problems. First is the broken promise. A camera or 
 
 303. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 292, at 605. 
 304. Id. at 600. 
 305. Cecilia Kang, F.T.C. Approves Facebook Fine of About $5 Billion, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/12/technology/facebook-ftc-fine.html 
[https:// perma.cc/WKV9-KQLC]. 
 306. Public Statement, Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Rohit Chopra Regarding the 
Matter of Facebook, Inc. (July 24, 2019); Public Statement, Dissenting Statement of 
Commissioner Rebecca Kelly Slaughter Regarding the Matter of FTC vs. Facebook (July 24, 
2019). 
 307. Complaint at 4, In re TRENDnet, Inc., No. C-4426 (Jan. 16, 2014). 
 308. Id. at 2. 
 309. See id. at 5. 
 310. See id. 
 311. Id. (“[The] compromised live feeds . . . allowed the unauthorized surveillance of infants 
sleeping in their cribs, young children playing, and adults engaging in typical daily activities.”). 
 312. Id. at 6. 
 313. Agreement Containing Consent Order at 4, In re TRENDnet, Inc., No. C-4426 (Jan. 16, 
2014).  
 314. See id.  
 315. See Lesley Fair, D-Link Settlement: Internet of Things Depends on Secure Software 
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network is described as private, but the company fails to deliver on that 
privacy guarantee. Second is the unauthorized hacker. Information is 
supposed to be restricted to those with security credentials, but it can be 
more widely accessed. An FTC staff report on the Internet of Things 
echoes this emphasis, listing security as its first issue.316 There is a sense 
in which this is the bare minimum that the government can ask of a 
company—do not affirmatively lie and do not leak private information 
by accident. The much harder question is whether the government should 
go further. When should intentional (as opposed to accidental, hacked, or 
leaked) sharing of consumer information be limited? That same FTC staff 
report notably waffled on this issue. The report was summarizing the 
conclusions of a workshop discussion on privacy in the Internet of Things 
and the participants appear to have been extremely divided.317 Some 
participants were concerned about companies discovering unexpected 
uses for consumer data, while other participants thought minimizing data 
collection to prevent such future uses would “chok[e] off potential 
benefits and innovation.”318 
Consider a third-party energy-monitoring product called Sense. This 
product works independently of a smart meter; the user must install 
physical clamps around the main power leads.319 The device then 
measures electrical usage several times a second, using the resultant data 
as inputs for the same kind of device disaggregation described earlier.320 
It is a classic Internet of Things device that just happens to duplicate the 
functionality of a particularly intelligent smart meter. By default, it is 
going to be regulated under the same FTC consumer-privacy framework 
as the cameras in TRENDnet. Given that it is going to be within the FTC’s 
purview and will force the FTC to confront all the same data-sharing 
trade-offs as smart meters, it makes sense to also task the FTC with 
regulating smart meters themselves. 
But even if the FTC chooses not to apply a heightened privacy 
standard to Internet of Things devices, the lack of choice involved in the 
utility sphere—people often cannot choose their utility or whether to have 
a smart meter—shifts the balance in favor of more restrictions. People 
must actively choose to install Sense whereas they likely will not be able 
to choose whether to have a smart meter installed. Even if the Internet of 
Things in general should remain something of a wild west, here there 
should be greater regulation. We therefore propose legislating additional 
 
 316. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 299, at 10. 
 317. Id. at 3–4. 
 318. See id. at 21 (alteration in original) (quoting Dan Caprio, McKenna, Long & Aldridge, 
LLP). 
 319. How It Works, supra note 58. 
 320. See id.; see also supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text (explaining device 
disaggregation). 
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authority for the FTC, allowing it to serve a more proactive role than its 
baseline Section 5 authority permits. Specifically, the FTC should be 
required to issue regulations for the protection of consumer data—rather 
than the advice and recommendations that it puts out in the data-security 
context—and to enforce those regulations with monetary fines. In this 
way, EUPA should mirror the enforcement authority given to the FTC 
under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.321 
This role of the FTC is the most important part of the proposal. The 
basic idea of protecting consumer privacy in this domain, at some level, 
has been around for a while. Some of the principles we promote were 
reflected in the Voluntary Code of Conduct proposed by the Department 
of Energy in 2015, for instance.322 But the very first word in the title of 
that document reveals its most fundamental problem: “voluntary.” 
Energy-consumption data pierces the walls of the home, invading what 
are otherwise the most protected spaces in daily lives. Industry self-
regulation and voluntary compliance are insufficient here. 
A.  Use of Smart Meter Data by the Utilities 
Many of the benefits of smart meters for grid management involve the 
use of smart meter data by the utilities themselves. It is the utility, after 
all, that needs to know about localized power outages, to calibrate 
production to meet demand, and to selectively deactivate portions of the 
grid in emergencies. To realize these benefits, smart meter information 
does not need to be shared beyond the utility and its chosen (and carefully 
monitored) subcontractors. There should, therefore, be a sharp distinction 
between use of this information by the utility for internal purposes, which 
should be presumptively allowed without restriction, and use by any other 
actor. Since the utility is the entity that naturally collects smart meter data 
and has the most use for it, it makes the most sense for the utility, whether 
it be publicly or privately owned, to be the primary custodian of smart 
meter data. Keeping this data housed within utilities may also reassure 
consumers, who are more likely to trust their utilities than third parties.323 
The privacy protections of smart meter data available to consumers 
should not depend on the type of utility serving their area. For the most 
 
 321. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114, 1128 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1681–1681x (2012)). 
 322. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, VOLUNTARY CODE OF CONDUCT (VCC): FINAL CONCEPTS AND 
PRINCIPLES 1 (2015), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/01/f19/VCC%20Concepts% 
20and%20Principles%202015_01_08%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/8M54-UVC7]. 
 323. Chien-fei Chen et al., Between the Technology Acceptance Model and Sustainable 
Energy Technology Acceptance Model: Investigating Smart Meter Acceptance in the United 
States, 25 ENERGY RES. & SOC. SCI. 93, 101 (2017) (noting that the participants of the Amazon 
Mechanical Turk survey “generally trusted their utilities, but were fairly concerned with 
unauthorized third parties’ misuse of [smart meter] data or personal information”). 
53
Kugler and Hurley: Protecting Energy Privacy Across the Public/Private Divide
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
504 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72 
 
part, consumers are unable to switch between utility providers; thus, 
leaving consumers exposed to varying levels of data protection based on 
the public, private, or ambiguously mixed character of the utility is 
problematic. Instead, a uniform set of protections should be established 
for all consumers.  
In the context of a publicly owned utility, questions may be raised as 
to what governmental entity owns the smart meter data. In that case, 
ownership should be limited to the utility itself and not a larger governing 
body, such as the city or township.324 The goal of this new regulatory 
scheme is to limit the access to the smart meter data while providing 
utilities with the ability to manage the smart grid. Allowing the smart 
meter data to be housed by a governmental entity other than the public 
utility risks exposure of this private data to a wider group of people, 
potentially including law enforcement.  
As the constitutional information-privacy cases like Nelson and 
Whalen illustrate,325 courts should distinguish between different 
government uses of information when weighing privacy rights. Utilities 
are properly positioned to use this data both for the benefit of grid 
management and to protect consumers. The proposed regulatory scheme 
would not only establish that utilities are owners of the smart meter data, 
but it would also establish guidelines and regulations around when 
commercial entities and law enforcement agencies can access and utilize 
the data. Since these entities are seeking to access the data for different 
purposes—market development for one326 and in aid of investigations for 
the other327—different guidelines must apply to them.  
 
 324. EISEN ET AL., supra note 25, at 71–72 (noting that public power systems can include 
local, municipal, state, and regional utilities, which can range in size from tiny municipal 
distribution companies to giant systems such as the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power; 
some are regulated by state public utility commissions and others are regulated by local 
governments or are self-regulated); What is Public Power?, PUB. POWER FOR YOUR COMMUNITY, 
https://www.publicpower.org/system/files/documents/municipalization-what_is_public_power.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PU4Z-P6VT] (“Most public power utilities are owned by cities and towns, but 
many are owned by counties, public utility districts, and even states.”).  
 325. See supra Section II.D. 
 326. Forbush, supra note 109, at 367 (“[P]otential commercial uses for smart meter data 
include use by ‘[r]etailers of appliances, extended warranties, or repair services [who] may want 
[smart meter] data . . . to provide advertising . . . before an appliance fails,’ and ‘[i]nsurers [who] 
may want to look for evidence of unauthorized conduct . . . .” (alterations in original) (quoting 
Mark F. Foley, The Dangers of Meter Data (Part I), SMARTGRIDNEWS.COM (June 2, 2008), 
http://www.smartgridnews.com/artman/publish/Technologies_Metering_News/The_Dangers_of
_Meter_Data_Part_1-446.html)).  
 327. United States v. Golden Valley Elec. Ass’n, 689 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012) (“A 
DEA agent filed an affidavit in the district court stating that the subpoenaed [electricity-
consumption] records were relevant to determine whether individuals at three residences were 
involved in the manufacture and distribution of controlled substances.”); McLean, supra note 64, 
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B.  Law Enforcement Access 
Though law enforcement agencies have a strong and legitimate 
interest in detecting illegal activities occurring in a home and verifying a 
suspect’s claims about what occurred in a home, the new regulatory 
regime must incorporate the baseline understanding that consumers have 
an expectation of privacy in the smart meter data generated from their 
homes. As discussed in Part II, consumers are not necessarily consenting 
to the installation of smart meters or freely sharing this data with the 
utilities—these are required aspects of modern-day life. Moreover, law 
enforcement must not be able to utilize the business-records exception to 
access smart meter data records collected by a private utility.328  
This is a substantial change from current practice. There has been a 
long “history of voluntary utility compliance with government requests 
to share personal consumer usage information.”329 Though a few states 
have statutes protecting consumer utility data, even these privacy-
protective states often allow utilities to respond to requests by law 
enforcement if they have subpoena or other court order rather than 
insisting on a warrant.330 In light of cases like Kyllo and Carpenter, 
however, the warrantless provision of smart meter data to law 
enforcement agencies is overly intrusive. The records of the utilities are 
simply too revealing and go back too far to allow for sharing without legal 
process. Law enforcement agencies should have to demonstrate probable 
cause and argue for the need to access such data before an independent 
arbiter (that is, “get a warrant”) instead of meeting the lower standard 
required for court orders or subpoenas.  
Though a warrant requirement will undoubtedly slow criminal 
investigations, it will not unduly frustrate the investigative process. 
 
at 885 (“Smart meter data present a potential new tool for law enforcement to investigate a broad 
set of crimes and even track people’s whereabouts. Law enforcement could use smart meter data 
as either direct or circumstantial evidence for any number of crimes.”); Affidavit of Probable 
Cause to Obtain An Arrest Warrant, supra note 3 (demonstrating that another example of this 
occurred in a recent case where a police department in Arkansas was provided the data from a 
smart water meter by the local utility without a warrant to aid it in the investigation of a murder) 
(“As previously mentioned, at least 140 gallons of water was used at James’ residence in the two 
hour period between 0100-0300 hours. Upon reviewing all water usage information, since 
October 2013 at James’ residence, this excessive amount of water usage between 0100 and 0300 
hours had never before occurred.”). 
 328. Contra Golden Valley, 689 F.3d at 1116–17 (holding that consumers lacked a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in energy-consumption records because they had “no 
possessory or ownership interest” in the records held by a utility company (quoting United States 
v. Cormier, 220 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
 329. McLean, supra note 64, at 886.  
 330. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 17, § 710.6 (2019) (“Pursuant to a warrant, subpoena duces 
tecum, or other court order.”); COLO. CODE REGS. § 723-3:3027(b) (2019) (“[T]his includes 
responses to requests of the Commission, warrants, subpoenas, [or] courts orders . . . .”). 
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Recall that smart meter data is in the custody of the utility. Consumers-
cum-criminal suspects do not have the ability to edit or delete their data. 
Smart meter data is also neither a weapon that suspects can seize nor a 
bomb that must be quickly located and disarmed. In short, this data can 
wait.  
We can imagine a set of law enforcement uses that might be ill-suited 
for the warrant process. Smart meter data could be useful, for instance, in 
determining if a house is presently occupied in advance of a raid or an 
arrest, or as part of a manhunt. But we are aware of no cases in which it 
has been used in that fashion. So, though we are open to persuasion that 
there are cases in which a narrow exigency exception must be added to 
the statute, we do not believe we need to craft one quite yet. If one is 
necessary, the Wiretap Act provides a suitable model for ex post approval 
under special circumstances and Congress could easily borrow the 
language from that statute for this one.331 
More controversially, EUPA should go further than imposing a 
warrant requirement by borrowing portions of the superwarrant 
requirements from the Wiretap Act.332 These additional requirements are 
burdensome and are part of the Wiretap Act because of the uniquely 
sensitive information contained in real-time communications. But they 
are justified in this context as well. The home is a special place; allowing 
the government to see through its very walls is precisely the kind of 
technological development that has so upset the Court in cases like Kyllo. 
A judge should therefore need to find probable cause that particular 
information concerning the offense will be obtained from the smart meter 
data requested. Further, the court must find that alternatives to accessing 
the smart meter data were attempted and failed, or “reasonably appear to 
be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.”333 To prevent this 
from becoming a routine request, only government officials of a certain 
level should be able to apply for a warrant to access the data.334 Finally, 
to protect against unnecessary governmental access, the updated 
provision should minimize the amount of information that can be 
produced in response to the warrant—limited to very specific time 
periods to avoid sweeping in data beyond the scope of the initial order.335  
In crafting these additional restrictions, we seek to restrict two 
possible types of bulk data collection. First, the police should not be able 
to request smart meter data for an entire residential district to determine 
 
 331. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (2018). 
 332. See Paul Ohm, The Investigative Dynamics of the Use of Malware by Law Enforcement, 
26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 303, 329–31 (2017) (discussing de facto superwarrant protections, 
particularly in relation to the Wiretap Act). 
 333. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (imposing a similar requirement for wiretaps). 
 334. See, e.g., id. § 2516(1) (imposing a similar requirement for wiretaps). 
 335. See, e.g., id. § 2518(5) (imposing a similar requirement for wiretaps). 
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who was home at a given time. Second, the police should not be able to 
engage in, or require utilities to engage in, data mining based on an 
energy-use suspect profile.336 In each case, there is an easy argument that 
the information is relevant to potential investigations and thus might 
satisfy a subpoena requirement. The additional restrictions would make 
it much harder to justify these sorts of requests.  
C.  Private Access 
Government actors are not the only parties that are interested in 
accessing smart meter data. Many private companies, including those 
working to develop energy-efficiency or renewable-energy programs for 
utility customers, would like access to develop their products, enhance 
their algorithms, and target their potential clients.337 Private companies 
will also be involved in the development of the smart grid, especially in 
creating appliances and software applications for smart home energy-
management systems. To encourage innovation and new developments 
in this area, these companies need to be allowed to create products that 
will interact with smart meters—it is only through automation and 
interconnectivity that the true potential of the smart grid will be realized.  
But the risk associated with smart grid development is that the 
extremely private information will be gathered from the home—the place 
where privacy is the most important. Marketers, among other private 
companies, will want to tap into this data to find out helpful information 
about the household to target certain products to it.338 Targeted 
advertising of an individual or a household represents an area of huge 
interest. For example, prior work in this area suggested that “they could 
use energy consumption data to identify heavy energy users, cross-
reference that data with households that have not applied for a new 
furnace permit in twenty years, and target those residents for furnace 
replacement programs.”339Additionally, insurance companies are 
interested in accessing home smart meter data for underwriting 
purposes.340 These companies are outside of the consumer–utility 
relationship and therefore require additional restrictions on what they can 
access.  
 
 336. Generally, this applies to marijuana-growing operations.  
 337. Andrew Bartholomew, Note, The Smart Grid in Massachusetts: A Proposal for a 
Consumer Data Privacy Policy, 43 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 79, 92 (2016) (“If these third parties 
were permitted to acquire consumer usage information directly from the utilities, it might create 
an avenue through which commercial efficiency operations could identify potential customers and 
market their services accordingly.”). 
 338. Forbush, supra note 109, at 367 (noting that the potential commercial uses for smart 
meter data include appliance retailers, repair-service companies, and insurance-coverage 
companies).  
 339. Klass & Wilson, supra note 12, at 1100. 
 340. Forbush, supra note 109, at 367. 
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One study has indicated,  
[t]rust concerns might also arise from perceived loss of 
control, especially the control over [smart meter] data, so 
utilities enterprise managers should allow customers to 
retain some level of control and . . . combat misperceptions 
that [smart meter]s are designed to control residents’ energy 
consumption at any time and monitor them like “big 
brother.”341  
To have more control over their smart meter data, consumers need to be 
made aware of exactly the kind of data that a company is able to collect 
from their homes and how the data is being used and provided some 
mechanism for control of that data. Moreover, consumers should be able 
to decide whether to share their data with private companies and, after 
sharing it, limit what their data may be used for. An important goal of any 
legislation in this area should be to prevent the creation and sale of 
electronic dossiers of consumers’ home lives as catalogued by their smart 
meters and connected smart devices. And, due to consumers’ limited time 
and attention, an effective regulatory regime cannot rely solely on 
boilerplate grants of customer consent. Protecting privacy will require 
more than a one-time check box. 
For commercial entities, EUPA should include provisions that provide 
consumers with more information and power to protect their private data. 
As a model for this kind of regulation, consider the example of the 
California Consumer Privacy Act.342 In 2018, California passed the most 
progressive privacy law in the United States, which provides consumers 
with several new rights related to their personal data.343 The Act includes 
the right to know what personal information a business has collected and 
the right to opt out of allowing a business to sell personal information to 
third parties, and it requires third-party data disclosures to consumers.344  
Other states also have statutory privacy protections that do not allow 
utilities to share monthly consumer data without the customer’s written 
or electronic consent.345 Ohio goes further by requiring that utilities also 
include a statement highlighting customers’ right of refusal to have their 
data released.346 Texas prohibits an electric utility from “selling, sharing, 
or disclosing information generated, provided, or otherwise collected 
 
 341. Chien-fei Chen at al., supra note 323, at 101. 
 342. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 (West 2019). 
 343. Jolly, supra note 277, at 5. 
 344. CIV. § 1798.100. 
 345. See Data Access, AM. COUNCIL FOR ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., https://database.aceee. 
org/state/data-access [https://perma.cc/5TST-JLL3].  
 346. See OHIO ADMIN. CODE 4901:1-10-05(J) (2019).  
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from an advanced metering system.”347 But the Texas public utility 
commission allows an electric utility to share information with an 
affiliated corporation or other third-party entity “if the information is to 
be used only for the purpose of providing electric utility service to the 
customer or other customer-approved services.”348 Similarly in Colorado, 
utilities are only authorized to utilize customer smart meter data 
“exclusively in furtherance of predefined smart grid goals.”349 Congress 
can look to these provisions when deciding which consumer protections 
it wants to include in EUPA. At a minimum, consumers should be 
notified when utilities seek to share their smart meter data and should 
receive information about whether they are able to decline to participate.  
One possibility that does not appear to have been explored is the use 
of the utility as a communication portal between third parties and utility 
customers. Imagine that an energy-efficiency company believes that its 
product can save money for customers with a given energy profile. One 
approach would be to allow the utility to sell a list of such customers to 
the company without consumer consent. This is problematic from a 
privacy perspective for obvious reasons. Another approach is to allow 
consumers to opt into third-party marketing. This is better from a privacy 
perspective but runs into serious scope-of-consent issues—it would be a 
challenge to appropriately calibrate how much information should go 
from utility to company or to sensibly decide how many companies 
should get the data, and one could easily imagine most consumers finding 
the choice confusing. A third possibility would be to have the utility serve 
as a matchmaker. It could host an energy-efficiency portal (as many 
utilities do) and populate it with offers from energy companies that the 
utility’s own data suggest are good matches for the consumer. The 
consumer could then decide whether to reach out to the companies. This 
would, in a way, be nothing more than an expansion of energy-efficiency 
programs, such as the Home Energy Assessment program, offered by 
many utilities.350 This would also provide consumers with a single point 
of contact if they wish to assert, or waive, privacy protections.  
The above describes the challenge of marketing—how to connect 
consumer to company to allow for socially beneficial transactions—but 
does not as directly address product development. How can companies 
safely be given enough information to enable them to create new energy-
efficient solutions? Here it may be beneficial to borrow from another 
federal privacy statute, the Health Insurance Portability and 
 
 347. TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 39.107(k) (West 2019). 
 348. Id. (emphasis added). 
 349. McLean, supra note 64, at 898. 
 350. See, e.g., Home Energy Assessment, COMED, https://www.comed.com/WaysToSave/ 
ForYourHome/Pages/SingleFamily.aspx [https://perma.cc/MUN7-ECTM]. 
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Accountability Act (HIPAA).351 Both medical and energy research 
benefit greatly from the sharing of individual information, yet there are 
also great privacy risks in both contexts. The HIPAA solution to this 
dilemma is to have two possible channels for research use of medical 
information.352 The first is to allow free use of de-identified 
information.353 In the energy domain this could cover many uses. Though 
location-based characteristics are relevant to energy analysis, the biggest 
of those is weather, and weather is notoriously large. One does not need 
block-level granularity to track the effect of temperature increases on air-
conditioning costs. The FTC could do exactly what the U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services did in the HIPAA context: develop 
guidelines for what constitutes sufficiently de-identified data in this 
domain and allow utilities to distribute exactly that much information.354 
The FTC should also have companies obtaining this de-identified data 
agree to certain use restrictions, particularly a restriction on efforts to re-
identify consumers or to link the smart meter data to individually 
identifiable datasets. 
HIPAA also allows for the use of individually identifiable health 
information in research under tight restrictions.355 In general, this 
information can only be obtained for specific planned research studies 
(rather than general “may be useful later” studies) that have been 
reviewed by an ethics board.356 Furthermore, the information must be 
carefully protected, and the affected patient must give consent.357 These 
requirements seem ill-suited for the kind of big-data approaches that 
energy-efficiency companies wish to employ. The de-identified path is 
therefore likely to be better suited for most energy projects. As described 
in the next Section, many local utilities are already implementing this 
kind of information sharing using their own standards for anonymization.  
  
 
 351. Though we disagree with Alexandra Klass and Elizabeth Wilson on many points, we 
think they are correct to use HIPAA as a model for making energy consumption data available for 
research purposes. 
 352. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(c)-(d) (2019). 
 353. See id. § 164.502(d). 
 354. See id. § 164.514(a)–(c) (outlining the guidelines for what constitutes sufficiently de-
identified data). 
 355. See id. § 164.502(c). See generally DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PROTECTING 
PERSONAL HEALTH INFORMATION IN RESEARCH: UNDERSTANDING THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 
(2004), https://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/pdf/HIPAA_Booklet_4-14-2003.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/KV38-U99T] (describing broadly the rules and regulations that apply when using 
identifiable health information in research). 
 356. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 355, at 11. 
 357. Id. at 11–12.  
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D.  Incorporating Smart Grid Development Goals into EUPA 
A final consideration that must be addressed within EUPA itself is the 
recognition of the importance of smart meter data to the development of 
the smart grid. As discussed in Part I, utilities have a real need for this 
data and sharing smart grid data with each other and other entities in the 
energy industry would go far in assisting with the smart grid. Much of 
this data can and should be anonymized before sharing to better protect 
consumers’ information. Fortunately, there are several different models 
currently in existence for sharing this data that can serve as an example 
for Congress.  
Many utilities are starting to share anonymized energy-usage data to 
encourage the continued development of the smart grid. For example, 
Chicago’s utility, ComEd, now shares anonymized usage data with 
commercial entities looking to develop new products, academics and 
researchers using the data for energy-related scholarship, and companies 
looking to develop new technology for the home.358 Illinois law prohibits 
ComEd and other utilities “from sharing customers’ billing and usage 
data without authorization, but it allows more freedom to share ‘generic 
information.’”359 In Vermont, utilities are required to share “town-scaled 
aggregate data” with the statewide energy-efficiency program 
administrator to demonstrate which “communities have achieved the 
greatest saving through efficiency, and also how much the need for new 
electricity generation has been reduced.”360 These examples demonstrate 
how anonymized, aggregated data can help energy-efficiency providers 
and smart grid developers with more information about energy usage. 
Ultimately, this information could help both utilities and other companies 
optimize the smart grid and reduce energy consumption.  
In addition to voluntarily anonymizing customer data, many utilities 
also participate in the Green Button Initiative, which “fosters the 
development, compliance, and adoption of the global Green Button 
electricity-, natural gas-, and water-usage data-sharing standard” and 
enables consumers to share their energy-usage data without any personal 
 
 358. See David J. Unger, Illinois Regulators Approve Utility Plan to Share Anonymous 
Energy Usage Data, ENERGY NEWS NETWORK (Feb. 21, 2017), https://energynews.us/2017/ 
02/21/midwest/illinois-regulators-approve-utility-plan-to-share-anonymous-energy-usage-data/ 
[https://perma.cc/C7AV-XKT6] (noting that ComEd’s “Anonymous Data Service removes any 
personal information⎯including names, addresses and electric account numbers⎯that might 
identify individual users”).  
 359. Id.  
 360. AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., BEST PRACTICES FOR WORKING WITH 
UTILITIES TO IMPROVE ACCESS TO ENERGY USAGE DATA 9 (2014).  
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information attached to it.361 The Initiative helps customers protect their 
private data while also encouraging them to share their energy-usage data 
with interested third parties to better understand how they are consuming 
energy.362 The Green Button Alliance, which includes utility members 
who are a part of the Green Button Initiative, joined the DataGuard 
Energy Data Partnership Program, which “is a voluntary program that 
provides high-level principles around the treatment, retention and 
disposal of customer data.”363 This program can also serve as a guide to 
Congress when writing the necessary provisions of EUPA. It is vital that 
EUPA encourage and enable the sharing of energy-usage information to 
help with the continued development of the smart grid.  
A final consideration for the protection of consumers’ smart meter 
data is understanding the risk of other devices connecting to the smart 
meter and potentially also recording the smart meter data. While the risk 
presented by the growth of the Internet of Things and interconnected 
devices in the home is outside the scope of this Article, Congress should 
consider building in additional protections for devices that specifically 
overlap with the smart meters in smart homes. For example, EUPA could 
require a warrant for law enforcement to obtain all information collected 
by the covered devices to ensure that all private power information is 
afforded a consistent level of protection. EUPA could be written broadly 
to be more inclusive in regard to the kind of devices that may connect to 
a smart meter; “the exact technology that collects the information is not 
the crucial point, but rather the nature of the information collected will 
trigger the application of [the] statute.”364  
While this solution is not a silver bullet and there will be continued 
problems with both public and private entities improperly accessing 
smart meter data, it is the most straightforward solution to start protecting 
smart meter data today. Technology is progressing so fast that both the 
courts and Congress have not been able to keep up with it. Time is of the 
 
 361. Green Button Alliance Launches Green Button Connect My Data (CMD) Certification 
Program for Electricity, Natural Gas, and Water Utilities, GREEN BUTTON ALLIANCE (Sept. 5, 
2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/green-button-alliance-launches-
green-button-connect-my-data-cmd-certification-program-for-electricity-natural-gas-and-water-
utilities-300706792.html [https://perma.cc/JM64-V6FU]; see also Green Button for My Home, 
GREEN BUTTON DATA, http://www.greenbuttondata.org/residential.html [https://perma.cc/CY4A-
9SS8] (explaining how the program operates and how consumers can sign up). 
 362. Unger, supra note 358.  
 363. Smart Energy Consumer Collaborative and Green Button Alliance Become Inaugural 
Members of DataGuard Energy Data Privacy Partnership Program, GREEN BUTTON ALLIANCE 
(June 27, 2018), https://www.greenbuttonalliance.org/smart-energy-consumer-collaborative-and-
green-button-alliance-become-inaugural-members-of-dataguard-energy-data-privacy-partnership-
program [https://perma.cc/T7XM-YQUF].  
 364. Bianchini, supra note 103, at 26 (arguing for an amendment to the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act with a fourth statute to encompass noncommunicative intimate 
information collected by digital assistants).  
62
Florida Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 3 [], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol72/iss3/1
2020] PROTECTING ENERGY PRIVACY ACROSS THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE 513 
 
 
essence—Congress needs to act now to ensure that consumers’ intimate 
data from the home is adequately protected. EUPA provides at least one 
path forward for allowing the necessary access to important smart grid 
data while also protecting consumers’ privacy in the home.  
CONCLUSION 
The development of the smart grid creates many benefits for energy 
efficiency, environmental protection, and grid stability. The challenge is 
whether society may allow the full exploitation of those benefits while 
still protecting consumer privacy. Since society is currently at the 
precipice of huge technological changes both in the home and in the smart 
grid, now is the time to build in additional protections for consumers and 
their homes.  
Writing his dissent in Olmstead v. United States365 in 1928, Justice 
Louis Brandeis recognized the risk that technology and the progression 
of science posed to the people of the United States. He noted: 
“[I]n the application of a constitution, our contemplation 
cannot be only of what has been but of what may be.” The 
progress of science in furnishing the Government with 
means of espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping. 
Ways may some day be developed by which the 
Government, without removing papers from secret drawers, 
can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled 
to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the 
home.366 
It is fair to say that society may have reached the point that Justice 
Brandeis was alluding to. Accessing smart meter data provides the 
government with encyclopedic insight into occurrences and activities 
within the home—perhaps the last sacred place recognized by the Fourth 
Amendment. Yet current Fourth Amendment protections likely do not go 
far enough in protecting smart meter data from improper use. Therefore, 
Congress must step in to provide additional safeguards against this kind 
of collection of information from the home. The proposed solution—
EUPA—will not protect everything that occurs within the home, but it 
prevents both the government and commercial entities from capitalizing 
on this new required technology. The Act would require a warrant before 
law enforcement may access smart meter data. It would also require 
consumer knowledge and consent before their private data may be shared 
with commercial entities. And it would place the regulation and oversight 
 
 365. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and 
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).  
 366. Id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
63
Kugler and Hurley: Protecting Energy Privacy Across the Public/Private Divide
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
514 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72 
 
of this intimate data within the purview of one federal agency that can 
track and monitor the utilization of smart meter data.  
Finally, the efficient and effective use of smart meters is key to 
combating climate change. Instead of getting in the way of utilities 
sharing and utilizing this necessary information, EUPA would recognize 
the importance of anonymizing and aggregating community energy-
usage data. It is integral that utilities have this data to increase the 
efficiency of the grid as a whole and to help decarbonize the electricity 
sector, but the government must implement safeguards to protect 
consumers and the intimacies of the home. EUPA provides a way to 
encourage smart grid development while also protecting consumers’ data 
privacy. And due to the continued advancement of technology in this 
area, no more time can be spared in creating a regulatory framework that 
addresses these issues. Smart meters should be optimized along with the 
development of the smart grid, but their optimization should not come at 
the cost of consumer privacy. 
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